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Abstract
Firms with credit-default swaps (CDS) traded on their debt may face “empty cred-
itors” as hedged creditors have less incentive to participate in firm restructuring.
We test for the existence of empty creditors by employing an exogenous change to
the bankruptcy code in Germany, that effectively removes their potential impact
on CDS firms. Using a unique dataset on bank-firm CDS net notional and credit
exposures we find that the probability of default for firms with CDS traded on them
drops when the effect of empty creditors is removed. This effect increases in the
average CDS hedge position of a firm’s creditors and in the concentration of the
firm’s debt. Further, we find that firms with longer credit relationships, with higher
average collateral ratios of their debt, and financially safer firms are less affected by
empty creditors. Banks that are not capital constrained, and that are liquidity con-
strained recognise the empty creditor effect to a larger extent. Furthermore, banks’
business models affect the degree to which they recognise the empty creditor effect.
Where banks that monitor their creditors less and that earn a smaller portion of
their income from interest activities, recognise the empty creditor effect to a larger
extent.
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1 Introduction
Credit Default Swaps (CDS) allow investors to trade on a firm’s credit risk. Creditors
of a referenced entity (i.e., a firm that issued debt on which a CDS trades), for example,
could hedge their credit risk through the CDS market, and in this way become “empty
creditors”. CDS have been subject to intense criticism related to the opacity of who
holds the ultimate exposures and for their role in the financial crisis.1 While these
criticisms may be warranted, to properly determine if a financial product is beneficial,
the costs and benefits associated with that product need to be understood.2 For a bank,
for example, the ability to lay off credit risk should be weighed against the incentives
to monitor its borrowers (Parlour and Winton, 2013). In this paper, we focus how the
referenced firm is affected by the legal scope of credit events in CDS contracts (over
which the firm has no control).
Creditors hold control rights under the debt contract. CDS may change the rela-
tionship between creditors and borrowers as the formal ownership of debt claims can
be decoupled from the economic exposure to credit deterioration. Creditors who pur-
chase “no-restructuring” CDS contracts have an increased incentive to push the CDS
referenced entity into bankruptcy to collect the payout from the CDS contract. Re-
structuring is not a credit event in case of a no-restructuring CDS contract. This gives
rise to “empty creditors” who have less incentive to accommodate in firm restructur-
ing (Bolton and Oehmke, 2011). In contrast to creditors, other parties with positions
in CDS are not involved in a firm’s restructuring or bankruptcy decisions and thus do
not have control rights. In this paper, we use a change in German insolvency law as a
quasi-natural experiment to identify if and how the presence of empty creditors causes
changes in firms’ probability of default.
The potency of the empty creditor effect crucially relies on the combination between
the creditors’ ability to restructure a firm and the recognition of restructuring as a credit
event in the CDS contract. Standard North-American CDS contracts only consider
bankruptcy as a credit event. Next to bankruptcy, Standard European CDS contracts
also have restructuring as a credit event (ISDA, 009a,b). Prior to 2012, the German
insolvency law prohibited restructuring, implying that CDS on German firms were de
facto Standard North-American contracts as they only recognized bankruptcy as a credit
1In reference to CDS, Pope Francis has stated that “The spread of such a kind of contract without
proper limits has encouraged the growth of a finance of chance, and of gambling on the failure of
others, which is unacceptable from the ethical point of view.” (Pope Francis, 2018). See Stulz (2010)
for a detailed discussion on the role of CDS in the crisis.
2See Augustin, Subrahmanyam, Tang, and Wang (2016) for an overview of the literature on the costs
and benefits of CDS. The authors point out the need for more research to be conducted on the topic
to attain a better understanding of the welfare implications.
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event.
Prior to 2012, German firms with CDS traded on them were thus, potentially, ex-
posed to empty creditors. The modification of the German insolvency law in 2012 (the
ESUG reform act) made restructuring a credit event bringing them in line with Stan-
dard European CDS contracts.3 In particular, the legal change introduces debt-equity
swaps in restructuring, activating the restructuring pay-out clause on German reference
entities. After the modification of the German insolvency law, creditors which purchase
restructuring CDS contracts do not have an increased incentive to push the CDS ref-
erenced entity into bankruptcy. The reason is that these CDS also pays out when the
referenced entity merely restructures its debt (i.e., ”before” bankruptcy). Thus, the le-
gal change weakened the effect of empty creditors for these entities. This quasi-natural
experiment allows us to identify the impact of empty creditors on firms’ probability of
default. In particular, the removal of the impact of empty creditors for German reference
entities should have led to a decrease in their probability of default around this event
relative to other similar German firms who do not have CDS traded on them. German
firms who do not have CDS traded on them are also exposed to this reform but they
were never affected by empty creditors.
The literature on the cost and benefits of CDS for the referenced firms focuses on
the role of CDS in debt renegotiations. Bolton and Oehmke (2011) model how credi-
tors who are able to purchase CDS to improve their bargaining power in restructuring
negotiations. In their model, CDS then act as a commitment device as creditors are
more easily able to force bankruptcy when firms strategically default (e.g., cash-flow
manipulation). This reduces a firm’s incentive to strategically default, which, ex-ante,
increases its financing capacity. The improved financing capacity leads to an increase
in firms’ investment, leverage, value, and a decrease in their cost of debt. However,
Bolton and Oehmke (2011) show that creditors will “over-insure” (i.e., purchase more
CDS on a firm than is socially optimal) in equilibrium. This increases the probability
of default for these firms. The latter reflects the impact of empty creditors on CDS
firms. The increase in the probability of default, due to over-insurance, may lead to a
decrease in the financing capacity of firms. This leads to an ambiguous effect of CDS
trading on firms financing capacity. Similarly, the increase in leverage may lead to an
increase in the probability of default for these firms. Thus, when considering both the
commitment effect of CDS and the empty creditor effect, the costs and benefits of CDS
are ambiguous, even theoretically.
We focus on the Bolton and Oehmke (2011) model as it allows us to disentangle
the increase in a referenced firm’s probability of default that is a result of the empty
3“Gesetz zur weiteren Erleichterung der Sanierung von Unternehmen” - BGBl. I S. 2582.
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creditor effect, from the increase that is a result of the firm increasing their leverage
through the commitment effect. This distinction is important, as firms have control over
the effect of CDS on their probability of default through the commitment effect. This
is because they make the decision to use the increased financing capacity by increasing
their leverage and hence their probability of default. Contrarily, firms which are exposed
to the empty creditor effect, experience an increase in their probability of default without
their consent.
To empirically identify the impact of empty creditors, some researchers relied on the
initiation of CDS trading on a firm (Subrahmanyam, Tang, and Wang, 2014; Colonnello,
Efing, and Zucchi, 2016). This initiation may be endogenous as CDS may be introduced
on a referenced entity when a firm’s probability of default is increasing. Other researchers
employ the implementation of the CDS Big Bang Protocol which essentially removes
restructuring as a credit event (Danis, 2016). This implementation may fail to identify
the effect of empty creditors as any increase in the probability of default could also be a
result of the commitment effect causing an increase in leverage, and thus the probability
of default.4 We resolve these issues by employing an exogenous shock to the bankruptcy
law of Germany which specifically changes the restructuring law. We are thus able to
identify the effect of CDS trading on a firm’s probability of default which is a result of
exposure to empty creditors.
Our empirical analysis draws upon multiple datasets providing us with all relevant
information. We obtain CDS position data at the creditor-firm level from the Depository
Trust & Clearing Corporation (DTCC), and combine this with creditor positions from
the German Credit Registry (MiMik). We then merge this with a database contain-
ing detailed firm information (USTAN), and another dataset containing CDS spreads
(Markit). We supplement this dataset with the Deutsche Bundesbank’s BISTA and
GuV databases, containing quarterly bank balance sheet, and income statement infor-
mation, respectively. Lastly, we combine the resulting dataset with macroeconomic data
obtained from DataStream.
The impact of empty creditors can be expected to manifest itself at the firm level;
hence, we collapse the dataset to this level. When collapsing from bank-firm to firm level,
we weigh each bank-firm observation by the proportion of credit the bank provides to the
firm. This provides us with more accurate firm-level estimates of bank-firm variables. In
particular, a firm’s creditors’ estimates of the firm’s probability of default is weighted by
the proportion of credit each creditor provides to the firm. By collapsing the bank-firm
4More generally, the use of North American CDS reference entities will may result in this issue.
While Danis (2016) does not study the probability of default to measure the effect of empty cred-
itors, the likelihood of a successful restructuring may still be related to firm leverage.
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level data to firm level data in this way, we embed the view that larger creditors have
more information on the firm and are more important to the firm. We then average
firm observations in the period before the announcement and in the period after the
implementation, to avoid serial correlation in the standard errors (Bertrand, Duflo, and
Mullainathan, 2004).
We find that empty creditors affect CDS firms as the probability of default for these
firms drops when the effect of empty creditors is removed.5 In particular, compared to
German non-CDS firms, German firms with CDS traded on them witness a decrease in
their probability of default by up to 2 percentage points after the change in the law, i.e.,
after the empty creditor effect is modulated. Additionally, we find that the impact of
empty creditors as measured through the drop in the probability of default increases in
the average CDS hedge position of its creditors. Specifically, the empty creditor effect
for a firm with an average CDS hedge ratio (0.05) is between 1.05 and 1.49 percentage
points, where a one standard deviation increase in the firm’s CDS hedge ratio (2.47)
sees the empty creditor effect increase by an extra 1.1 percentage points. Further, we
find that firms with less concentrated debt, longer credit relationships and firms with
higher average collateral ratios of their debt are less affected by empty creditors. While
financially risky firms are severely affected by empty creditors, safe firms are not affected.
Banks that are not capital constrained, and that are liquidity constrained recognise the
empty creditor effect to a larger extent. Furthermore, banks’ business models affect the
degree to which they recognise the empty creditor effect. Where banks that monitor their
creditors less and that earn a smaller portion of their income from interest activities,
recognise the empty creditor effect to a larger extent.
We further test the assumption of Bolton and Oehmke (2011) that the incentive for
empty creditors to push CDS firms into default is “priced in” to the CDS spreads. We
find that this is indeed the case. We do so by comparing CDS spreads of treated German
entities with those of other European companies unaffected by the change in German
insolvency law. We find that after the treatment, CDS spreads on average drop by 49
to 120 basis points.
We conduct multiple robustness tests and find that the treatment and control groups
follow parallel trends prior to the event. While generally important in a difference-in-
differences set-up, it is key for our findings as the treatment and control group are both
affected by the law change. This is to say that because the change in the bankruptcy
law affects both the treatment and control group, the groups need to be identical apart
5In line with our predictions, we do not find a significant treatment effect when comparing the leverage
of CDS firms to non-CDS firms, suggesting the commitment effect was not at play. Hence, the change
in the probability of default is a result of the modulation of the empty creditor effect and not due to
a reduction in leverage.
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from the treatment group being CDS referenced entities. If this weren’t the case any
differential response to the law change may be a result of some characteristic other than
the treatment having CDS traded on their debt. To account for this concern, we match
the treatment and control groups on firm size, alternative z-score, book leverage, and
change in the probability of default in the pre-announcement period, using the coarsened
exact matching technique (Iacus, King, and Porro, 2012). As a further robustness test we
change the control group to European CDS firms which, while more similar to German
CDS firms than German non-CDS firms are, did not have the law change applied to
them. Hence, the average treatment effect where the control firms are European CDS
firms includes both the empty creditor effect and the effect of the ability to restructure
a firm. Thus, while the use of European CDS firms provides a good robustness check,
it is not the ideal control group, and hence we use matched German non-CDS firms for
the majority of our analysis.
Additionally, we enforce constant membership over the sample so as to account for
asymmetric selection bias. That is, we define treatment firms as firms which have CDS
traded on their debt over the whole sample period, while control firms are firms that
never have CDS traded on their debt. This is done to account for the possibility that
the event alters the likelihood of being treated (i.e., being a CDS referenced entity),
differentially across the treatment and control groups, which would bias the results.
Finally, the results are robust to placebo testing, matching, using alternative matching
variables, a shorter event window, or using different weights in averaging bank-firm data
and to not averaging the data at all.
This paper contributes to the literature on the effects of CDS trading on the un-
derlying firms in six ways. First, by virtue of having detailed CDS and credit position
data we are able to avoid a common assumption in the literature, that the existence of
CDS implies that the creditors of the firm are trading CDS on the firm. Second, by
making use of these data, we are able to determine that the effect of empty creditors is
increasing in magnitude with the CDS hedge position of a firm’s creditors. Third, by
employing an exogenous shock to the bankruptcy law, we avoid a potential endogene-
ity issue associated with a common event used in the literature, the initiation of CDS
trading. Fourth, by employing the particular exogenous shock, we can disentangle the
effect of CDS as a commitment device from the effect of empty creditors. Fifth, we shed
light on the firm and bank-firm relationship characteristics that increase the intensity
of the impact of empty creditors on CDS firms. And finally, we confirm an important
assumption of many theoretical papers in the literature, that the incentive for empty
creditors to push CDS firms into default is priced into CDS spreads.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: Section 2 reviews the theoretical
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and empirical literature on the effects of CDS trading. In section 3 we develop the
identification of empty creditors and associated hypotheses. In section 4, the data, its
sources as well as its construction, are discussed. Sections 5 to 9 present the results
while section 10 presents several robustness checks. Section 11 concludes.
2 Credit Default Swaps & Corporate Default
What are empty creditors?
While the primary purpose of CDS is to reduce the credit risk of the protection buyer,
by transferring it to the protection seller, it also has significant effects on the bank-firm
relationship.6 The main channel through which CDS affects the bank-firm relationship
is through its effect of separating a creditor’s control rights from its credit exposure to
the referenced firm.
When a creditor gives a loan to a firm, it obtains both credit exposure, the risk the
firm may not be able to pay back the loan, as well as control rights. Control rights
can be formal, as in the right to vote in bankruptcy proceedings, or informal, as in a
creditor’s ability to refuse to roll over a firm’s debt unless certain conditions are met. A
CDS contract on the other hand contains only credit exposure as it is a contract with
a third party (the CDS counter-party, usually another bank). Hence, when a creditor
purchases or sells CDS on a firm to which it lends, it can adjust its credit exposure to
the firm, while leaving its control rights unaffected.
Further, while CDS is often compared to an insurance contract, a key difference
between CDS and an insurance contract is the limit to the insured amount. Traditional
insurance limits the insured amount to the underlying exposure, while there is no limit
to the exposure through CDS. For example, if a home-owner, wants to purchase fire
insurance on her home, the maximum insurance value is the market value of the property.
Under the same rules as for CDS, she would be able to insure the house for more than
its worth or sell fire insurance on the property, in which case, her counter-party in the
insurance contract would be purchasing insurance on an asset to which they do not
otherwise have an economic exposure to.
In the case a creditor purchases CDS on its borrower, they reduce their credit ex-
posure, and may in fact reverse their exposure, such that they benefit from a credit
deterioration of the referenced firm. However, these creditors retain their control rights
over the firm both formally, a vote in bankruptcy proceedings, and informally. Legal
scholars (Scott-Quinn and Walmsley, 1998; Hu and Black, 2008a,b) discuss the potential
6See Appendix A.1 for detail on Credit Default Swap contracts.
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for this separation to cause creditors, which no longer have an interest in the efficient
continuation of the CDS referenced entity, to push the firm into an inefficient liquidation
or bankruptcy in order to collect the CDS insurance. A creditor which purchases CDS
on its borrower is known as an “empty creditor” to highlight its lack of credit exposure
to the firm. As there is no limit on CDS exposures, empty creditors may purchase CDS
such that they would benefit from a referenced firm’s bankruptcy. In this case, the
empty creditor has both the incentive, CDS insurance payment, and the means, formal
and informal control, to push a firm into default.
The theory of empty creditors
The theoretical literature on the effect of CDS trading on referenced entities pre-
dicts that the introduction of CDS trading on a firm increases its probability of default
(Bolton and Oehmke, 2011; Arping, 2014; Danis and Gamba, 2018), decreases strategic
default (Bolton and Oehmke, 2011), increases firm investment (Bolton and Oehmke,
2011; Arping, 2014; Danis and Gamba, 2018), increases leverage and firm value (Bolton
and Oehmke, 2011; Arping, 2014), increases the maturity of debt (Arping, 2014), and
reduces debt covenants (Arping, 2014). The theory disagrees on the impact of the rel-
ative bargaining power of creditors and shareholders, while Bolton and Oehmke (2011)
predicts larger benefits to the firm, Colonnello et al. (2016) predict that firms with rel-
atively strong shareholders experience more severe negative side effects of CDS trading
on their debt.
Further, the theory predicts that these effects vary by firm characteristics, debt
market characteristics and CDS trading characteristics. Firms which are small, opaque,
have low profitability, have high asset or cash-flow volatility, have low credit quality,
that are financially constrained, have low asset tangibility, whose debt is difficult to
renegotiate, or which are more likely to undergo restructuring enjoy the largest benefit
from CDS trading on their debt (Bolton and Oehmke, 2011; Arping, 2014; Danis and
Gamba, 2018).
We focus on the Bolton and Oehmke (2011) model as it allows us to disentangle the
increase in a referenced firm’s probability of default that is a result of the empty creditor
effect from other, potentially confounding, effects (e.g., the commitment effect).
Bolton and Oehmke (2011) take a neutral view on the effect of CDS trading on
referenced entities. The authors model the effect of CDS in a limited commitment
model of credit to determine ex-ante and ex-post consequences of default insurance on
credit outcomes. They argue that while empty creditors may indeed have the incentive
not to accept a restructuring proposal of a distressed borrower, this does not necessarily
7
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imply an inefficient outcome (i.e., there may be potential benefits). The source of these
potential benefits stems from a reduction in moral hazard (cash flow manipulation) and
hence an increase in the financing capacity of referenced firms.
Figure 1: A stylized diagram of the Bolton and Oehmke (2011) model
A stylized version of the Bolton and Oehmke (2011) model is depicted in Figure 1,
which is a representation of a cash-flow manipulation problem incorporating CDS con-
tracts. Here, firms finance a project with a positive net present value, by borrowing
the required investment from a creditor. The firm’s realised cash-flow, Y , is privately
known to the firm. Thus, in the case the project is successful, the firm has an option to
under-report its cash-flows and default on its debt (i.e., strategically default), thereby
entering into debt renegotiation with its creditors. Creditors are only able to verify the
firm’s realised cash-flow by incurring a verification cost.7
If a firm strategically defaults, it enters into a renegotiation with its creditors and
if successful it keeps the difference between the realised cash-flow and the renegotiated
amount, Y−R2 > Y−R1. This causes a moral hazard problem as firms have the incentive
to strategically default, while banks can only confirm strategic default by conducting
a costly audit. The potential for strategic default to occur causes creditors to reduce
the credit they are willing to supply to the firm. In order to reduce a firms incentive to
strategically default, a creditor would need to commit to forcing the firm into bankruptcy
or liquidation and thus remove the benefit the firm gains from strategically defaulting.
Creditors have a limited ability to commit to forcing bankruptcy in the case of strategic
default as it is assumed that the value of the firm in continuation (i.e., restructured) is
greater than its liquidation value, R2 > L.
Figure 1 includes CDS insurance, CDSXR, which only pays out on bankruptcy.
When a creditor can trade CDS, the creditor will not accept the restructuring proposal
if they are sufficiently insured and the CDS contract only pays out on bankruptcy (L+
CDSXR > R2).
The implication is that CDS act as a commitment device where creditors are more
7This implies the bargaining power of the creditor is negatively related to its verification cost.
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easily able to commit to forcing bankruptcy in the case of strategic default. The presence
of CDS then reduces a firm’s incentive to strategically default, which, ex-ante, increases
the firms debt capacity. The improved debt capacity of firms leads to an increase in
their investment, leverage, firm value, and a decrease in their cost of debt. Bolton and
Oehmke (2011) show that these benefits are larger for firms with a low proportion of
fixed assets or with mostly unsecured creditors, where creditor bargaining power is weak
(low credit concentration). Further, firms which are more likely to restructure (highly
volatile or low credit quality firms) should benefit more from this commitment effect.
However, Bolton and Oehmke (2011) show that creditors tend to “over insure” in
equilibrium (i.e., purchase more CDS on a firm than is socially optimal). In this case
the empty creditor has the incentive to push an otherwise healthy firm into bankruptcy,
CDSXR > R1, and has the means to do so, as it has formal and informal control. This
results in an increase in the probability of default for these firms, the empty creditor
effect. The increase in the probability of default, due to the empty creditor effect,
may lead to a decrease in the financing capacity of firms, which leads to an overall
ambiguous effect of CDS trading on firms’ financing capacity. Thus, in the case of over-
insurance, the benefits of CDS are unclear. Further, as referenced firms may increase
their leverage through CDS acting as a commitment device, their probability of default
may increase. Hence, when CDS acts as a commitment device the source of the increase
in the referenced firms probability of default is unclear.
Empirical evidence
The empirical investigations into the effects of CDS and empty creditors on financially
distressed firms have produced mixed findings. Subrahmanyam et al. (2014) show in a
large sample of distressed and healthy firms that the introduction of CDS increases the
probability of bankruptcy. However, Caglio, Darst, and Parolin (2018) find that CDS
hedging by a firm’s creditors may in fact decrease the probability of default of these firms.
Using a small sample of distressed companies, Bedendo, Cathcart, and El-Jahel (2016)
find that CDS do not have a significant effect on the likelihood of bankruptcy. Danis
(2016) contributes to this debate by providing further evidence that empty creditors
have a negative effect on out-of-court debt restructuring. Colonnello et al. (2016) find
that the relative bargaining power of shareholders and creditors affects the propensity for
creditors to trade CDS which affects the intensity of the real effects of empty creditors.
In this paper, we aim to resolve this disagreement by employing a novel identification
strategy that disentangles the direct effect of empty creditors on referenced entities from
the confounding effects through the effect of CDS as a commitment device. Additionally,
9
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this identification strategy avoids potential endogeneity issues associated with the use of
the initiation of CDS trading as an event, a common event employed in the literature.
Further, by virtue of having granular data on creditors’ CDS positions, we are able
to extend the extant literature by investigating which firm, bank, and bank-firm char-
acteristics affect the intensity of the empty creditor effect. Moreover, this granular CDS
position data enables the avoidance a common assumption in the literature, that the
existence of CDS implies the creditors of the referenced entities are trading CDS on the
referenced entity. We are able to avoid having to make this assumption as we combine
bank-firm credit exposures with banks’ exposures to firms via CDS, thus providing a
bank-firm level CDS hedge ratio.
The empirical literature is not limited to the negative effects of CDS through empty
creditors and has investigated a wide range of effects of CDS. Narayanan and Uzmanoglu
(2018) show that a firm’s value decreases on the initiation of CDS trading, and that this
effect increases in CDS trading activity at firm level. They show the reduction in firm
value is caused by an increase in the cost of capital for these firms, through a reduction
in their stock liquidity and credit quality. Subrahmanyam, Tang, and Wang (2017)
find that CDS firms hold more cash after CDS trading commences, which they argue
is to avoid negotiations with tougher empty creditors. Saretto and Tookes (2012) find
that firms with CDS traded on them can sustain higher leverage and borrow at longer
debt maturities. Ashcraft and Santos (2009) show that the improvement of credit terms
hinges on the riskiness of the firm, where safe and transparent firms see an improvement
in their borrowing terms when CDS begins to trade on them. Bartram, Conrad, Lee,
and Subrahmanyam (2019) conduct a cross-country analysis and show that the initiation
of CDS trading on firms debt affects real decisions within these firms, such as leverage,
investment and the riskiness of their investments. Further, they find these effects to be
larger in countries where CDS help to mitigate weak property rights and where there
is less uncertainty about the enforcement of obligations due under the CDS contract.
Gündüz, Ongena, Tümer-Alkan, and Yu (2017) find that banks purchase more protection
on riskier firms and firms to which they have higher existing credit exposures. Further,
the authors find an increase in a bank’s CDS position leads to a relatively higher credit
exposure to safer firms after the CDS Small Bang. Beyhaghi, Massoud, and Saunders
(2016) investigate the propensity of banks to use credit risk transfer instruments, such
as CDS. They find that banks are more likely to use credit risk transfer instruments
(e.g., CDS) the more capital or liquidity constrained they are.
10
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3 Institutional Setting: Change in Bankruptcy Law
Before introducing the institutional setting and the quasi-natural experiment, we
discuss two key assumptions of the Bolton and Oehmke (2011) model and how the
failure of each of these assumptions alters the way in which CDS affects referenced firms.
Afterwards, we will indicate how the change in bankruptcy law given our institutional
setting allows us to identify the effect of empty creditors.
There are two key assumptions in the Bolton and Oehmke (2011) model. First,
the applicable bankruptcy law should permit restructuring, specifically debt-to-equity
swaps. Second, the CDS contract must only pay out in the case of bankruptcy (i.e.,
restructuring cannot be recognised as a credit event). Clearly, the second condition only
plays a role if the first condition is met, i.e., if it is not possible to restructure, it does
not matter if restructuring is defined as a credit event.
The second assumption, that CDS only pays out in the event of bankruptcy, CDSXR
in Figure 1, is required for the benefits (the commitment effect) to be felt. If the
CDS contract defines restructuring as a credit event it would payout on restructuring
and bankruptcy, CDSMM , as represented in Figure 2. Hence, the CDS payout would
not affect the creditors decision to accept the referenced firm’s restructuring proposal,
R2+CDSMM > L+CDSMM ↔ R2 > L . Therefore, the commitment effect requires the
assumption, that the CDS contract only pays out on bankruptcy, to hold (Bolton and
Oehmke, 2011). Further, insured creditors have reduced invectives to push referenced
firms into bankruptcy as they would collect the CDS insurance payment when the firm
restructures. Hence, the referenced firm will not experience the empty creditor effect.
Therefore, in the scenario represented by Figure 2 the referenced firm experiences neither
the empty creditor effect nor the commitment effect.
Figure 2: The Bolton and Oehmke (2011) model with restructuring as a credit event
11
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The first assumption that firms are able to restructure their debt is key too.8 This
is because the commitment effect only arises as a result of a reduction in strategic
default which would only be entered into if restructuring is possible. This assumption is
represented by the dashed lines in Figure 2. However, if firms are not able to restructure,
the impact of empty creditors will still be felt as creditors still have the incentive to push
firms into default and receive the CDS pay-out, as in Figure 3.
In summary, when both conditions are met, CDS trading on a referenced firm creates
both the commitment effect and the empty creditor effect, as in Figure 1. The adverse
effect of CDS trading, the effect of empty creditors, requires only the first assumption
to fail, as in Figure 3. If restructuring is permitted and defined as a credit event, in
this context, CDS has no effect on the underlying firm, as in Figure 2. Figure 4 outlines
these conditions as well as the effect of two key events.
Figure 3: The Bolton and Oehmke (2011) model without restructuring
In this analysis, our sample includes European CDS referenced firms, which trade
with the standard European CDS contract. This standard contract defines restructuring
as a credit event, and hence CDS on European firms will pay out when they restructure.
Therefore, the second assumption does not hold and there is no commitment effect of
CDS trading for European referenced entities, even if the applicable bankruptcy law
allows for restructuring. This implies that European CDS referenced firms are either in
the scenario represented by Figure 2 (no empty creditor effect or commitment effect), or
by Figure 3 (only the empty creditor effect) if the domicile country’s law does not allow
restructuring.
In Germany prior to 2012, the bankruptcy law all but prohibited restructuring, which
is evident as they occurred in only 2% of insolvency cases (Höher, 2012). The lack of
restructuring negotiations, i.e., the first assumption failed, meant that German reference
entities experienced the effect of empty creditors without the potential confounding
affects on their probabilities of default through CDS as a commitment device, as in
8Bolton and Oehmke (2011) refer specifically to an out-of-court restructuring (e.g., through a debt
exchange or a debt-for-equity swap).
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Figure 3.
In 2012, German insolvency law was substantially reformed by the ESUG reform
act. This law change allowed for debt-equity swaps in restructuring negotiations.9 This
reform effectively fulfilled the first assumption of the (Bolton and Oehmke, 2011) model
as restructuring became possible. However, as European CDS define restructuring as a
credit event, the reform essentially activated the restructuring pay-out clause on German
reference entities and thus removed the impact of empty creditors for these firms, as in
Figure 2.
Therefore, the prediction is that German CDS referenced firms should have expe-
rienced a decrease in their probability of default after the change in bankruptcy law
relative to similar German firms without CDS traded on them.10
Further, the theory, as outlined in the previous section, predicts that the intensity of
the impact of empty creditors varies with certain firm, bank and bank-firm characteris-
tics.
Lastly, another, more technical assumption of the Bolton and Oehmke (2011) model
is that the incentive for empty creditors to push referenced firms into default is priced
into the CDS spread. As the impact of empty creditors was removed for German ref-
erence entities by the reform, the CDS spread of German reference entities should have
decreased relative to the CDS spreads of firms from other European countries which did
not see any change to their exposure to empty creditors over this time period. However,
as the restructuring clause became active, there should have been a relative increase in
the CDS spread of German firms, as restructuring CDS pay out with more ease (Packer
and Zhu, 2005). Thus, we cannot determine the magnitude of empty creditors’ affect on
CDS spreads, but a reduction in spreads would be evidence that it is indeed priced, and
outweighs the restructuring effect.
9See Appendix A.2 for detail on the German Insolvency Law and the changes in 2012, ESUG. Closset
and Urban (2018) also study this reform. More specifically, the authors leverage a size threshold which
affects a particular part of the reform that would improve the bargaining power of large firms’ creditors
but not for small firms. They find that large firms decrease their leverage and investment, while small
firms see an increase in their leverage and investment as well as a decrease in their cost of debt. In our
methodology, we therefore match on firm size and other variables to make CDS firms comparable to
non-CDS firms, allowing us to extract the impact of the law on the effect of empty creditors. Further,
in all regressions except for the ones in which we test for the intensity of the impact of empty creditors,
we control for the legal definition of large firm.
10This reduction cannot be explained by a reduction in risk-shifting as modelled by Campello and Matta
(2012) as restructuring was not possible prior to the bankruptcy law change.
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Figure 4: CDS credit events and bankruptcy law
Note: This figure illustrates the two conditions for the positive and negative effects of CDS on an
underlying firm to be felt. The first is the ability to restructure a company under the domicile country’s
law. The second condition only plays a role if the first condition is met. The second condition is that
the CDS contract type should not pay out when the underlying debt is restructured. If restructuring
is not permitted under law, then the CDS contract type is irrelevant and the firms have no incentive
to strategically default (as they will be liquidated). However, the incentive for empty creditors to push
a firm into bankruptcy remains. If restructuring is permitted and defined as a credit event, in this
context, CDS has no effect on the underlying firm. Finally, if restructuring is permitted and not defined
as a credit event, then CDS acts as a commitment device as well as increases the probability of default
through the effect of empty creditors.
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4 Data
To test the aforementioned theories, we combine ten datasets containing detailed
CDS position data, CDS pricing data, credit exposure data, firm characteristics, bank
characteristics and macro economic data. Table 1 contains information on each variable
used in this paper, including: their unit, definition, and source.
We obtain detailed CDS position data from the Trade Information Warehouse (TIW)
of the Depository Trust and Clearing Corporation (DTCC). The DTCC-TIW datasets
are the most comprehensive datasets on granular CDS positions available, containing
between 90% and 95% of global CDS activity (Mayordomo, Peña, and Schwartz, 2014).
We employ a subset of this data. In particular, we obtain data on all CDS positions
where either a German bank is a party or counter-party, or where the reference entity
is German. The DTCC position level dataset contains individual bank’s CDS positions
on a reference entity with a particular counter-party, at a weekly frequency. We collapse
these data to obtain CDS positions of each bank on each reference entity at a quarterly
frequency. This level of granularity is not available from the public database of the
DTCC, which only shows CDS positions aggregated at firm level, and only for the top
1000 reference entities by gross notional.
We further match the DTCC data with CDS pricing data obtained from Markit.
This dataset contains the CDS spread and liquidity data for all traded CDS at a daily
frequency. Markit obtains this data by polling the CDS dealers for the price and liquidity
measures (e.g., bid-ask spreads).
Next, we match the resultant dataset with Moody’s CreditEdge which contains in-
formation on each firm’s loss given default, expected default frequency, market value of
assets, and other market based risk measurements.
We then match the CDS data with the German credit register (MiMik) which con-
tains bank-firm credit exposures and banks’ estimates of their borrowers, amongst other
data, at a quarterly frequency. This makes it possible to determine individual bank-
firm credit exposures and CDS hedge positions. The German Credit registry contains
detailed information on the exposures of each bank in the economy to each of its bor-
rowers. Further, each bank submits an estimate of a firm’s probability of default, which
we use as the measure of bankruptcy risk. Since each creditor submits its own estimate
of the firm’s probability of default, there is variation in a firm’s probability of default at
firm-time level which we exploit in a later regression.
15
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3521390
Table 1: Variable Descriptions
Variable Unit Definition Source
Probability of Default % Probability that the firm defaults on its debt. This is submitted by
each creditor of the firm.
MiMik
Net Notional / Total Credit unit The hedge ratio defined as CDS net notional / total credit MiMik & DTCC
CDS Reference Entity 0/1 Equal to 1 if the firm is a German firm with CDS traded on them
over the entire sample period, and equal to 0 if it never had CDS
traded on it, in the sample period.
DTCC
German CDS Reference Entity 0/1 Equal to 1 if a firm had CDS traded on them over the entire sample
period and is a German reference entity, and equal to 0 if it has
CDS traded on it but is domiciled in another European country.
DTCC
Spread bps 5 year fixed maturity CDS spreads where credit events are defined
so as to include restructuring, with a modified modified clause.
Markit
Length of Credit Relationship qrts The length, in quarters, the firm has had a credit relationship with
a particular bank.
MiMik
Number of Banking Relationships no. The number of credit relationships a firm has. MiMik
Firm Credit Concentration % The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of a firms credit market. Calcu-
lated as the sum of the squared share of each creditor of a firm.
MiMik
Collateral / Total Credit % The current value of the collateral attached to a credit exposure /
the current principal of the credit exposure outstanding.
MiMik
Firm Size log Log of total assets of the firm. USTAN
Book Leverage % Book value of debt / total assets USTAN
Alternative Z-Score % The Altman’s Z-score as modified by MacKie-Mason (1990), which
excludes leverage. A low Z-score indicates high default risk.
USTAN
Tangible Asset Ratio % Tangible assets / total assets. USTAN
Net Working Capital / TA % Net working capital / total assets. USTAN
Retained Earnings / TA % Retained earnings to total assets. USTAN
EBIT / TA % Earnings before interest and tax / total assets. USTAN
Legal Size 0/1 Equal to 1 if the firm met at least two of the size criteria under
the German Commercial Code, at any point in the period prior to
the reform. The criteria are: average number of employees greater
than 50, total sales greater than EUR38.5m, and total assets greater
than EUR19.25m
USTAN
Liquidity % Bank: liquid assets / total assets. BISTA
Capital % Bank: total capital / total assets. BISTA
NII % Bank: net interest income / gross earnings. GuV
Monitoring % Bank: staff and administration expense / gross earnings. GuV
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It should be noted that banks’ probability of default estimates of their borrowers
do not take into account the loss given default, and hence, are not affected directly
by hedging practices. In other words, a bank’s estimate of a borrowers probability of
default only measures the likelihood the borrower defaults, not the loss to the bank given
default. This is important, as otherwise the banks’ hedging practices (CDS positions)
would affect their probability of default estimates directly, not only indirectly through
the empty creditor effect.
We match this dataset with the Deutsche Bundesbank’s BISTA and GuV databases,
containing quarterly bank balance sheet, and income statement information, respec-
tively. We employ these datasets to calculate banks’ capital ratio, liquidity ratio, net
interest income, and monitoring costs.
Further, we combine the dataset with detailed firm balance sheet and income state-
ment data obtained from the Deutsche Bundesbank’s USTAN database for the German
firms, and Compustat for the European firms employed in our pricing regressions. Fur-
ther, we restrict the data to only include non-financial firms as there is a different
insolvency law for financial and insurance companies.
Additionally, we add macroeconomic data from DataStream and the Federal Reserve
Bank of St. Louis. We obtain overnight interest rate swap data from DataStream, and
GDP and inflation data from he Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis’ Economic database.
While we investigate the bank-firm level variation in a later regression, for the main
results we collapse the dataset to firm-time level taking the credit weighted average of
bank-firm level variables. For example, the credit-weighted average probability of default
is calculated as:
PDf,t =
Nc∑
b=0
Total Creditb,f,t∑Nc
b=0 Total Creditb,f,t
× PDb,f,t
where banks, firms and time are indexed by b, f and t, respectively. Nc represents the
total number of creditors for firm f .
Similarly we calculate the credit-weighted average hedge position of a firm’s creditors
as:
NetNotional / Total Creditf,t =
Nc∑
b=0
Total Creditb,f,t∑Nc
b=0 Total Creditb,f,t
× CDSNetNotionalb,f,t
Total Creditb,f,t
where banks, firms and time are indexed by b, f and t, respectively. Nc represents the
total number of creditors for firm f .
Further, we collapse data on the length of each bank-firm relationship, and the
proportion of collateral attached to each bank-firm credit exposure on firm-time level,
taking the credit weighted averages of all variables. This provides us with more accurate
17
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Figure 5: Event Timeline
Note: The figure illustrates the event time line. The red area depicts the period (2009Q3
to 2011Q2) prior to the announcement of the change in the bankruptcy law where German
CDS firms were exposed to empty creditors. The green area depicts the period after (2012Q3
to 2014Q2) the implementation where the treatment group was no longer exposed to empty
creditors. The horizontal lines for the treatment, solid, and control group, dashed, illustrate
that the data has been collapse to firm-period level (i.e., one observation per firm representing
the average probability of default for that firm in that particular period.). Finally, the level
drop in the line for the treated group after the implementation of the law change (green line
- red line) represents our hypothesis that the removal of the impact of empty creditors is
associated with a decrease in the probability of default of affected firms.
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firm level estimates of bank-firm variables. By collapsing the bank-firm level data to firm
level data in this way, we embed the view that larger creditors have more information
on the firm and are more important to the firm.
The data is further collapsed to avoid serial correlation in the standard errors (Bertrand
et al., 2004). When collapsing at firm-time level, the time level is determined by the
model which we test. For the main results we employ the change to the German
Bankruptcy law as an exogenous shock and thus we average firm level before the an-
nouncement of the law change, and after the implementation. Figure 5 depicts the time
periods of interest for the main regressions. As a robustness check, we test for placebo
effects by using the CDS Small Bang as the event. In this case, we average before and
after the the implementation of the CDS Small Bang. In both cases we employ data 8
quarters before the event and 8 quarters after the event. The results are robust to using
a shorter pre/post window of 4 quarters.
Defining treatment and control groups
For all regressions we define the treatment group as German CDS reference entities
which have CDS traded on them (CDS reference entities). In all regressions, except the
pricing regressions, the control group is defined as German firms which are not CDS
reference entities. This control group is not feasible for the pricing regressions as there
is no CDS price for a firm if there are CDS traded on its debt. Therefore, we define the
control group in the pricing regressions as other European CDS reference entities (i.e.,
European CDS reference entities excluding German reference entities). The use of other
European CDS reference entities as a control group is motivated by the fact that they
did not see any change to their exposure to empty creditors over this time period.
Two potential issues need to be accounted for given our definition of treatment and
control, i.e., treatment firms have CDS traded on their debt and control firms do not.
The previous literature on the effects of CDS trading on referenced entities has shown
that firms see an increase in their probability of default when CDS begins to trade on
their debt (Subrahmanyam et al., 2014; Danis and Gamba, 2018; Colonnello et al., 2016).
Hence, if the event alters the probability of being treated heterogeneously across treat-
ment and control firms, this may cause a difference in the average probability of default
for treatment and control firms across this event. To account for the potential that the
event changes the probability of being treated heterogeneously across our treatment and
control group, we restrict the definition of treatment and control to not allow switching
between the groups. That is, a firm is treated if it is a CDS reference entity over the
whole sample, and is defined as a control firm if it never has CDS traded on it, in the
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics: German Reference Entity Vs. German Non-Reference Entity
Control - German Firms with No CDS Traded Treatment - German Firms with CDS Traded
Count Mean Std. Dev P10 P25 P50 P75 P90 Count Mean Std. Dev P10 P25 P50 P75 P90
Probability of Default 1088 1.67 7.07 0.07 0.14 0.32 0.81 2.55 40 1.45 3.49 0.10 0.17 0.32 0.55 3.26
Firm Size 1088 12.35 1.02 11.30 11.59 12.11 12.83 13.86 40 16.27 1.08 14.87 15.36 16.30 17.24 17.84
Book Leverage 1088 64.87 18.01 42.82 53.41 65.70 76.91 85.53 40 64.36 16.50 43.82 53.76 65.97 77.13 83.31
Alternative Z-Score 1088 0.67 0.65 0.03 0.30 0.61 0.88 1.59 40 0.58 0.52 0.05 0.26 0.51 0.78 1.12
∆ Probability of Default 1088 -0.59 7.32 -0.94 -0.19 -0.03 0.02 0.13 40 -0.32 1.22 -1.76 -0.18 -0.04 0.02 0.11
Before Tangible Asset Ratio 1088 54.87 36.55 1.00 15.81 67.72 90.01 93.15 40 6.04 11.35 0.01 0.18 1.61 7.15 18.38
Announcement Firm Credit Concentration 1088 13.25 172.32 0.06 0.87 4.36 10.63 19.56 40 1.21 5.18 0.02 0.05 0.12 0.44 1.65
of Change in Net Working Capital / TA 1088 -2.77 17.56 -22.62 -8.81 -1.55 3.76 16.23 40 -1.33 19.45 -23.35 -16.07 -3.74 8.70 18.50
Bankruptcy Law Retained Earnings / TA 1088 13.98 21.64 -0.12 0.36 10.79 27.32 41.11 40 14.70 11.06 4.36 9.46 11.24 20.24 30.78
EBIT / TA 1088 2.26 6.57 -2.12 0.34 1.60 5.01 9.02 40 3.89 3.59 0.34 1.55 3.69 5.40 9.14
Sales / TA 1088 43.45 50.36 4.58 12.08 17.80 65.76 114.09 40 26.02 37.90 0.00 0.00 5.71 40.50 77.05
Length of Credit Relationship 1088 28.41 16.40 7.13 15.11 26.94 41.46 51.91 40 21.65 7.27 12.98 16.32 20.63 27.42 32.31
# Credit Relationships 1088 7.03 6.98 2.00 3.40 5.38 8.13 12.25 40 66.39 56.53 19.38 28.63 43.31 89.19 140.75
Collateral / Total Credit 1022 67.43 55.01 2.81 24.67 67.77 98.64 118.70 40 11.33 12.89 0.55 1.60 6.22 16.01 24.71
Net Notional / Total Credit 1088 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 40 1.40 2.47 -0.27 0.04 0.36 2.65 4.26
Probability of Default 1088 2.09 9.72 0.06 0.10 0.24 0.61 2.34 40 0.56 1.16 0.08 0.11 0.16 0.41 1.10
Firm Size 1022 12.42 1.03 11.34 11.65 12.16 12.90 13.93 38 16.42 1.07 15.02 15.51 16.40 17.32 17.97
Book Leverage 1022 63.10 18.16 40.17 51.87 63.76 75.43 85.32 38 60.98 17.71 39.03 49.67 61.74 72.15 81.65
Alternative Z-Score 1022 0.72 0.71 0.01 0.34 0.66 0.97 1.55 38 0.59 0.57 -0.05 0.29 0.51 0.78 1.41
After Tangible Asset Ratio 1022 56.13 36.37 1.07 17.22 72.23 89.84 92.97 38 5.86 12.41 0.01 0.09 1.19 6.55 14.33
Implementation Firm Credit Concentration 1088 10.37 64.77 0.01 0.58 4.19 11.08 20.59 40 0.78 2.68 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.18 1.24
of Change in Net Working Capital / TA 1022 -2.07 18.03 -20.70 -7.32 -1.62 3.87 17.14 38 -5.77 18.81 -26.38 -16.58 -5.84 2.14 12.97
Bankruptcy Law Retained Earnings / TA 1022 15.71 22.06 0.00 0.64 12.97 29.86 44.20 38 17.34 13.46 4.46 9.21 13.67 22.05 30.68
EBIT / TA 1022 2.80 6.45 -1.16 0.52 1.82 4.90 9.81 38 4.91 5.15 0.67 2.61 3.46 6.22 11.86
Sales / TA 1022 42.82 50.90 5.00 12.38 16.79 63.66 113.35 38 25.34 38.94 0.00 0.00 1.13 42.28 73.46
Length of Credit Relationship 1088 32.56 19.37 8.62 16.91 31.33 46.80 61.04 40 24.09 8.86 12.54 17.49 23.61 31.77 35.68
# Credit Relationships 1088 7.92 10.80 2.00 3.63 5.50 8.20 13.13 40 82.09 76.67 16.13 26.69 74.19 110.50 146.00
Collateral / Total Credit 1006 70.47 44.93 5.67 32.33 78.48 100.30 113.68 40 21.67 25.50 1.07 2.69 5.65 43.72 63.38
Net Notional / Total Credit 1088 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 40 0.78 2.07 -0.42 -0.04 0.40 1.22 2.24
Note: The table contains the sample statistics for the credit weighted sample. The table is split by treatment and control group, and by time (before announcement, after implementation). There is a
2 year window pre and post the event (i.e. 8 quarters = 0 prior, and 8 quarters = 1 after the event). The pre-announcement period runs from 2009Q2 to 2011Q2, and the post implementation period
runs from 2012Q3 to 2014Q1. The treatment group is comprised of German firms which had CDS traded on them both before the implementation and after the announcement of the law change. The
control group is comprised of German firms which never had CDS traded on them in the sample period. The treatment and control group are matched using the CEM method on: firm size, book leverage,
alternative z-score, and change in the probability of default in the prior period. Each observation represents the credit weighted average value for the firm in the respective period (e.g. 40 observations of
treated companies prior to the announcement represents 40 firms’ credit weighted average value for probability of default prior to the announcement of the law change) Table 1 contains information on each
variable used in the table, including: their unit, definition, and source.
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sample.
A second potential issue is that our treatment group, German CDS referenced firms,
are different from our control group, German firms not referenced in CDS contracts,
in such a way that biases the treatment effect. To account for this potential issue,
we match the treatment and control groups on firm size, book leverage, alternative
z-score, and average pre-announcement change in the probability of default using the
coarsened exact matching technique (Iacus et al., 2012). In other words, we match
the treatment and control group in order to make the groups more similar to each
other, such that we can conclude that any differential response to the event is a result
of CDS firms having had the empty creditor effect removed, rather than some other
systematic way in which CDS firms differ from non-CDS firms. The use of the coarsened
exact matching technique is motivated by the fact that propensity score matching often
increases imbalance, inefficiency, model dependence and bias (King and Nielsen, 2018).
However, the main results are robust to matching and the choice of matching variables.
An alternative option would be to define European CDS firms as the control group,
as they are more similar to German CDS firms than German non-CDS firms. Further,
European CDS firms did not experience any change in their exposure to empty creditors
over the sample period. Hence, there should be a differential response to the change in
bankruptcy law in Germany. However, using these firms as a control group would result
in the average treatment effect containing the effects of the ability to restructure a firm
as European CDS firms did not have this law change apply to them. Hence, the more
appropriate choice for control group is German firms which do not have CDS traded on
their debt.
The final dataset consists of 1,128 firms, observed over the period: 2009-2014, of
which 40 have CDS traded on them. Table 2 contains descriptive statistics for the
sample used in the main regressions, split by treatment and control group, and by time
period.11 As we match on firm size, an alternative z-score, book leverage before the
event, the mean of these variables for the treatment and control group are more similar
than they are in the unmatched sample.
While we do not match on the outcome variable, probability of default, it can be
noted from Table 2 and Table 17, in Appendix A.3, that the probability of default of the
control group becomes more similar to that of the treatment group prior to the event.
This is a first indication that the matching process was successful in creating a control
11In Appendix A.3, Table 17 provides descriptive statistics for an unmatched sample and Table 18
provides descriptive statistics for an unweighted, matched sample. The sample prior to matching
consists of 71,163 firms observations for probability of default and 9,969 firms with full data.
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group that is more similar to the treatment group than the unmatched control group.
Further, the fact that the average probability of default of the treatment group decreases
while the control group increases is initial evidence that the impact of empty creditors
was removed for the treatment group after the insolvency law change.
Finally, it can be noted that prior to the law change, on average, creditors of CDS
firms had a CDS hedge ratio of 1.4. While the average CDS hedge ratio reduced to 0.78
after the law change, the reduction was not statistically significant and only accounted
for approximately 25% of one standard deviation (2.47). This implies that although
creditors did not adjust their CDS hedge ratios in a statistically significant manner,
the removal of their incentives to push CDS firms into default was sufficient to see a
reduction in the empty creditor effect on the probability of default of affected firms.
5 Average Empty Creditor Effect
Before analysing the factors that alter the intensity of the empty creditor effect, we
test the average empty creditor effect. To do so, we employ the following regression
specification:
∆PDf = β1Treatedf + β4Zf,BA + αk + εf (1)
where firms and sectors are indexed by f and k, respectively. ∆PDi is the change in
a firm f ’s average probability of default after the implementation (denoted by “AI”) of
the law change (i.e., PDf,AI − PDf,BA) compared to average before the announcement
(denoted by “BA”). The vector Zf,BA is an indicator variable to control for the legal
definition of size, as legally large firms had an additional clause that applied to them in
the reform. Finally, αk are sector fixed effects and εf is an error term.
12 In all regressions,
the standard errors are clustered at sector level to account for the correlation structure
of the errors (Petersen, 2009).
Treatedf is equal to 1 if a firm f had CDS traded on it over the entire sample period,
and equal to 0 if it never had CDS traded on it, in the sample period. Given that the
effect of empty creditors is removed for treated firms after the change in bankruptcy law,
these firms should see a relative decrease in their probability of default, and therefore,
β1 is expected to be negative.
Table 3 contains the results for the base line regressions, Equation 1, where the
total average treatment effect is tested.13 We find positive, and significant, evidence
12Sector codes are defined as in WZ 2008 which is the German equivalent of NACE codes and comply
with the requirements of NACE Rev. 2
13It can be noted that the Adjusted R-squared values are low or sometimes negative in the regression
results tables. If we take column 1 of Table 3 as an example, CDS Ref. Entity is equal to 1 for only
22
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3521390
for the impact of empty creditors through a reduction in the probability of default for
CDS firms when the impact of empty creditors is removed. CDS firms see a 1.31 to
2.01 percentage point decrease in their probability of default when the effect of empty
creditors is removed, depending on whether sector fixed effects are included or not. This
is economically significant given that the average probability of default in the entire
sample is about 1.67 percent, and represents 38% to 57% of one standard deviation
(3.49 percentage points) of the probability of default in the treatment group prior to the
law change.
6 Empty Creditors in the Tails
Having tested the average effect of empty creditors, we now investigate the hetero-
geneous effect of empty creditors over the whole probability of default distribution by
separating the sample into quartiles of probability of default prior to the reform and
then running the main regression, Equation 1, on that particular quartile. When de-
termining the quartiles we do so based on the distribution of the probability of default
of referenced entities only. This is done to ensure that there are an equal number of
treatment firms in each quartile, i.e., 10 treatment firms in each quartile.14
We expect the effect of empty creditors to be particularly important in the right tail
of the probability of default distribution, and potentially non-existent in the left tail.
By separating the sample in quartiles of probability of default prior to the event, we aim
to determine if the riskiness of a firm determines the extent to which it experiences the
impact of empty creditors. Put simply, if firms are riskier, creditors need not “push”
them into default, but rather “nudge” them into default. Thus, we expect to see that
firms in the right tail of the probability of default distribution experience the impact of
empty creditors while it is unclear if safer firms would be affected.
The results for these regressions are presented in Table 4. The first column shows
the results for the whole matched sample which is equivalent to column 1 of Table 3.
Columns 2 to 5 contain the results where the sample is restricted to firms which belong
to the indicated quartile of probability of default prior to the event. The results from
columns 2 to 5 show that the treatment effect is statistically significant for riskier firms
(quartiles 3 and 4). Further, the size of the treatment effect is larger for firms in higher
quartiles. The average empty creditor effect for the riskiest firms (firms in the forth
40 of the 1128. Hence, CDS Ref. Entity cannot explain the change in the probability of default for
the 1088 non-CDS firms.
14The results are robust to using the entire sample to determine the quartile cut-offs, these are presented
in Table 15.
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Table 3: Empty Creditor Effect - Base Results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆PD ∆PD ∆PD ∆PD
CDS Ref. Entity -1.308∗∗ -1.354∗ -2.010∗∗ -1.993∗∗
(-2.20) (-1.75) (-2.34) (-2.05)
Legal Size Control No Yes No Yes
Sector FEs No No Yes Yes
Observations 1128 1128 1117 1117
Adj. R2 0.000 -0.001 0.032 0.031
Note: Difference-in-differences regression results for the change in probability of default of German
CDS reference entities relative to other German firms. The regression equation is:
∆PDf = β1Treatedf + β4Zf,BA + αk + εf
Where, ∆PDf is the change in firm f ’s average probability of default after the implementation of the
law change (i.e. PDf,AI − PDf,BA). Here the averaging is done by weighting each observation by the
percentage of the firm’s total credit provided by the reporting bank. Treatedf is equal to 1 if firm f is
a German firm with CDS traded on them over the entire sample period, and equal to 0 if it never had
CDS traded on it, in the sample period. The vector Zf,BA includes a control for the legal size of firm f
to control for the effect of a particular clause in the reform that affected only firms which were classified
as large under the German Commercial Code. Finally, αk are sector fixed effects. Here the event is
defined as zero for 8 quarters before the announcement of the law in 2011 Q2 and 1 for 8 quarters after
the implementation in 2012Q3. There is a 2 year window pre and post the event (i.e. 8 quarters =
0 prior, and 8 quarters = 1 after the event). The treatment and control group are matched using the
CEM method on: firm size, book leverage, alternative z-score, and change in the probability of default
in the prior period. All regressions cluster the standard errors at sector level. We report t statistics
between parentheses. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. It
can be noted that the Adjusted R-squared values are low or sometimes negative. This can be explained
by the fact that CDS Ref. Entity cannot explain the change in the probability of default for non-CDS
firms. If we take column 1 as an example, CDS Ref. Entity is equal to 1 for only 40 of the 1128.
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quartile) is 5.015 percentage points, which is approximately 10 times larger than less
risky firms (firms in the 3rd quartile). This indicates that riskier or more vulnerable
firms experience empty creditors more severely.
7 Intensity of the Empty Creditor Effect
We employ the following regression specification to test for the firm and bank-firm
relationship characteristics that affect the intensity of the empty creditor effect:
∆PDf = β1Treatedf + β2Xf,BA + β3TreatedfXf,BA + αk + εf (2)
where firms and sector are indexed by f and k, respectively. ∆PDi is the change in a firm
f ’s average probability of default after the implementation (denoted by “AI”) of the law
change (i.e., PDf,AI −PDf,BA) compared to average before the announcement (denoted
by “BA”). The vector Zf,BA, from Equation 1 was not included to avoid multicollinearity
issues. Finally, αk are sector fixed effects and εf is an error term. Treatedf is equal to 1
if a firm f had CDS traded on it over the entire sample period, and equal to 0 if it never
had CDS traded on it, in the sample period. In all regressions, the standard errors are
clustered at sector level to account for the correlation structure of the errors (Petersen,
2009).
The vector Xf,BA contains average, pre-announcement, credit weighted average bank-
firm and firm variables. The use of pre-announcement averages is equivalent to lagging
the Xf,BA vector, and is done to account for potential endogeneity. These variables
have further been demeaned, or centred, in order to improve the interpretation of the
β1 estimates. The interpretation of β1 is improved as once the Xf,BA variable have
been demeaned the magnitude of β1 represents the average empty creditor effect when
the Xf,BA variables are at their mean level. Xf,BA include bank-firm based variables:
the number of credit relationships a firm has, the average length of these relationships,
the ratio of loan collateral to loan value, the average creditors’ hedge ratio, and the
concentration of the firm’s debt. Further, it includes other firm characteristics: firm
size, book leverage, asset tangibility and EBIT to total assets.
Given that the effect of empty creditors is removed for treated firms after the change
in bankruptcy law, these firms should see a relative decrease in their probability of de-
fault, and therefore, β1 is expected to be negative. The expected sign for the β3 estimates
depend on the characteristic, Xf,BA, being tested. The firm characteristics: firm size,
book leverage, asset tangibility and EBIT to total assets are common determinants of
the probability of a firm defaulting in general. That is, firms which are smaller, highly
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Table 4: Empty Creditor Effect - Treatment Group Quartile Separation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Full Sample Quartile 1 Quartile 2 Quartile 3 Quartile 4
∆PD ∆PD ∆PD ∆PD ∆PD
CDS Reference Entity -1.308∗∗ -0.292 -0.506 -0.517∗∗ -5.015∗∗∗
(-2.20) (-1.08) (-1.07) (-2.21) (-2.94)
Legal Size Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1128 195 205 185 442
Control Firms 1088 185 195 175 432
Treated Firms 40 10 10 10 10
Adj. R2 0.000 -0.005 -0.005 -0.002 0.003
Note: Difference-in-differences regression results for the change in probability of default, where the
regression equation is:
∆PDf = β1Treatedf + β4Zf,BA + εf
Where, ∆PDf is the change in firm f ’s average probability of default after the implementation of the
law change (i.e. PDf,AI − PDf,BA). Here the averaging is done by weighting each observation by the
percentage of the firm’s total credit provided by the reporting bank. Treatedf is equal to 1 if firm f is a
German firm with CDS traded on them over the entire sample period, and equal to 0 if it never had CDS
traded on it, in the sample period. The vector Zf,BA includes a control for the legal size of firm f to
control for the effect of a particular clause in the reform that affected only firms which were classified as
large under the German Commercial Code. Here the event is defined as zero before the announcement
of the law in 2011 Q2 and 1 after the implementation in 2012Q3. There is a 2 year window pre and post
the event (i.e. 8 quarters = 0 prior, and 8 quarters = 1 after the event). The treatment and control
group are matched using the CEM method on: firm size, book leverage, alternative z-score, and change
in the probability of default in the prior period. All regressions cluster the standard errors at sector
level. In column 1 the full sample is used. In column 2-5 only those firms in the indicated quartile of
PDi,AI are included. We report t statistics between parentheses.
∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at
the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 5: Intensity of the Impact of Empty Creditors - Firm Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
∆PD ∆PD ∆PD ∆PD ∆PD ∆PD ∆PD ∆PD ∆PD ∆PD
CDS Ref. Entity -3.950∗ -3.461∗ -1.341∗∗ -2.125∗∗ -0.944 -1.075 -1.894∗∗ -2.603∗∗∗ -4.950∗∗∗ -3.188∗∗
(-1.94) (-1.97) (-2.38) (-2.55) (-1.29) (-0.95) (-2.47) (-2.87) (-3.25) (-2.02)
Firm Size -0.270 -0.194 -0.417 -0.177
(-0.87) (-0.62) (-1.34) (-0.58)
CDS Ref. Entity × Firm Size 0.979∗ 0.620 1.411∗∗∗ 0.763
(1.79) (1.21) (3.12) (1.53)
Book Leverage 0.012 0.009 0.013 0.007
(0.81) (0.53) (0.84) (0.47)
CDS Ref. Entity × Book Leverage -0.079∗ -0.050 -0.084∗∗∗ -0.053
(-1.75) (-1.33) (-2.69) (-1.49)
Tangible Asset Ratio -0.022∗∗∗ 0.006 -0.024∗∗∗ 0.004
(-2.82) (0.48) (-2.74) (0.27)
CDS Ref. Entity × Tangible Asset Ratio 0.030∗ 0.017 0.037∗ 0.028
(1.73) (0.74) (1.68) (0.97)
EBIT / TA 0.011 -0.046 -0.014 -0.044
(0.37) (-1.05) (-0.39) (-1.00)
CDS Ref. Entity × EBIT / TA 0.361∗ 0.317∗∗∗ 0.311∗∗ 0.255∗∗
(1.84) (2.75) (2.64) (2.24)
Sector FEs No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 1128 1117 1128 1117 1128 1117 1128 1117 1128 1117
Adj. R2 -0.001 0.031 -0.001 0.031 0.005 0.031 -0.001 0.032 0.004 0.027
Note: Difference-in-differences regression results for the change in probability of default of German CDS reference entities relative to other German firms. The regression equation is:
∆PDf = β1Treatedf + β2Xf,BA + β3TreatedfXf,BA + αk + εf
Where, ∆PDf is the change in firm f ’s average probability of default after the implementation of the law change (i.e. PDf,AI − PDf,BA). Here the averaging is done by weighting each observation by the
percentage of the firm’s total credit provided by the reporting bank. Treatedf is equal to 1 if firm f is a German firm with CDS traded on them over the entire sample period, and equal to 0 if it never
had CDS traded on it, in the sample period. The vector Xf,BA contains firm characteristics: firm size, book leverage, asset tangibility and concentration of its credit. Finally, αk are sector fixed effects.
Table 1 contains information on each variable used in the table, including: their unit, definition, and source. The event is defined as zero before the announcement of the law in 2011 Q2 and 1 after the
implementation in 2012Q3. There is a 2 year window pre and post the event (i.e. 8 quarters = 0 prior, and 8 quarters = 1 after the event). The treatment and control group are matched using the CEM
method on: firm size, book leverage, alternative z-score, and change in then probability of default in the prior period. All regressions cluster the standard errors at sector level. We report t statistics between
parentheses. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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levered, have low asset tangibility, and which have low profitability, are expected to be
more likely to default. Hence, in line with the results where we split the sample in the
riskier and safe firms, Table 4, we expect the empty creditor effect to be larger for firms
with characteristics that are associated with higher default in general.
In Table 5 we present the results for Equation 2 with firm characteristics as inter-
actions. For each variable, we report the results without and with sector fixed effects.
In line with the results from Table 4, we find that firms with riskier characteristics, are
more affected by empty creditors. Here we learn that firms which are smaller (column
1), have higher book leverage (column 3), have lower asset tangibility (column 5), and
which are less profitable (columns 7 and 8) are more affected by empty creditors.
In particular, the empty creditor effect for the average size firm is between 3.46
percentage points and 3.95 percentage points, where a one standard deviation increase
in size (1.08) sees the empty creditor effect reduce by 98 basis points. Similarly, the
empty creditor effect for a firm with an average book leverage (64.85%) is between
1.34 and 2.23 percentage points, where a one standard deviation increase in the firm’s
book leverage (16.5%) sees the empty creditor effect increase by an extra 1.3 percentage
points. This result implies that the empty creditor effect has consequences for the capital
structure decisions of firms, as CDS referenced firms have to include the increased empty
creditor effect into the trade-off between the debt tax shield and expected bankruptcy
costs. This may explain the result of Subrahmanyam et al. (2017), where firms hold
more cash, i.e., reduce leverage, once they become CDS referenced entities, as they are
adjusting their optimal capital structure in response to the empty creditor effect.
In Table 6 we present the results for Equation 2 with bank-firm based variables as
interactions. These are: the number of credit relationships a firm has, the average length
of these relationships, the ratio of loan collateral to loan value, the average creditors’
hedge ratio, and the concentration of the firm’s debt.
A creditors incentive to push a firm into default is predicted to be increasing in their
CDS hedge position, as their payout becomes larger when the firm defaults (Bolton and
Oehmke, 2011). Indeed, column 10 in Table 6 indicates that the larger the CDS hedge
positions of a firm’s creditors, the larger the empty creditor effect is for the firm. In
particular, the empty creditor effect for a firm with an average CDS hedge ratio (0.05)
is between 1.05 and 1.49 percentage points, where a one standard deviation increase in
the firm’s CDS hedge ratio (2.47) sees the empty creditor effect increase by an extra 1.1
percentage points.
Further, firms with long credit relationships (columns 1 and 2) are less severely
affected by empty creditors, where a one standard deviation (7.27) increase in the length
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Table 6: Intensity of the Impact of Empty Creditors - Bank-Firm Based Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
∆PD ∆PD ∆PD ∆PD ∆PD ∆PD ∆PD ∆PD ∆PD ∆PD ∆PD ∆PD
CDS Ref. Entity -0.576 -1.256∗ -1.940∗∗ -2.545∗∗∗ 0.380 -0.669 -3.623∗∗∗ -2.531∗∗∗ -1.054 -1.489∗ -1.546 0.804
(-1.39) (-1.82) (-2.46) (-2.70) (0.32) (-0.49) (-7.09) (-4.65) (-1.56) (-1.90) (-0.84) (0.53)
Len. of Relationships -0.042∗∗ -0.025 -0.031 -0.027
(-2.27) (-1.48) (-1.59) (-1.29)
CDS Ref. Entity × Len. of Relationships 0.156∗∗ 0.109∗∗ 0.119∗ 0.165∗∗
(2.39) (2.19) (1.74) (2.37)
# Creditor Relationships -0.010 0.001 -0.032 -0.019
(-0.48) (0.03) (-1.45) (-0.71)
CDS Ref. Entity × # Creditor Relationships 0.022 0.010 0.039∗ 0.020
(0.93) (0.44) (1.69) (0.73)
Collateral / Total Credit -0.020∗∗∗ -0.016∗∗∗ -0.018∗∗∗ -0.015∗∗∗
(-3.65) (-3.97) (-3.91) (-4.03)
CDS Ref. Entity × Collateral / Total Credit 0.052∗∗ 0.040∗ 0.039 0.033
(2.02) (1.68) (1.40) (1.36)
Firm Credit Concentration 0.000 -0.001∗∗∗ 0.000 -0.001∗∗∗
(1.15) (-7.92) (0.20) (-13.38)
CDS Ref. Entity × Firm Credit Concentration -0.200∗∗∗ -0.048 -0.157∗∗ 0.012
(-10.59) (-1.53) (-2.44) (0.19)
Net Notional / Total Credit -0.181 -0.448∗∗∗ -0.187 -0.577∗∗∗
(-1.40) (-4.34) (-1.27) (-3.48)
Sector FEs No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 1128 1117 1128 1117 1062 1053 1128 1117 1128 1117 1062 1053
Adj. R2 0.004 0.032 -0.002 0.031 0.011 0.045 -0.002 0.031 -0.001 0.032 0.008 0.041
Note: Difference-in-differences regression results for the change in probability of default of German CDS reference entities relative to other German firms. The regression equation is:
∆PDf = β1Treatedf + β2Xf,BA + β3TreatedfXf,BA + αk + εf
Where, ∆PDf is the change in firm f ’s average probability of default after the implementation of the law change (i.e. PDf,AI − PDf,BA). Here the averaging is done by
weighting each observation by the percentage of the firm’s total credit provided by the reporting bank. Treatedf is equal to 1 if firm f is a German firm with CDS traded on
them over the entire sample period, and equal to 0 if it never had CDS traded on it, in the sample period. The vector Xf,BA contains bank-firm based variables: the number
of credit relationships a firm has, the average length of these relationships, and the ratio of loan collateral to loan value. Finally, αk are sector fixed effects. Table 1 contains
information on each variable used in the table, including: their unit, definition, and source. The event is defined as zero before the announcement of the law in 2011 Q2 and
1 after the implementation in 2012Q3. There is a 2 year window pre and post the event (i.e. 8 quarters = 0 prior, and 8 quarters = 1 after the event). The treatment and
control group are matched using the CEM method on: firm size, book leverage, alternative z-score, and change in the probability of default in the prior period. All regressions
cluster the standard errors at sector level. We report t statistics between parentheses. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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of a firms credit relationships decreases the empty creditor effect by 1.13 percentage
points. Similarly, firms with more collateral attached to their debt (columns 5 and 6)
are less severely affected by empty creditors, where a one standard deviation (13%)
increase in the amount of collateral coverage on a firms debt increases the impact of
empty creditors by 68 basis points. Finally, we find that firms which have a more
concentrated market for their debt experience empty creditors more severely, as a one
standard deviation (5.18) increase in the concentration of the firms credit market sees
the impact of empty creditors increase by 100 basis points.
The effect of empty creditors is predicted to increase in the number of creditors a
firm has, as creditors compete to “empty” themselves first (Bolton and Oehmke, 2011).
This occurs, as creditors would want to ensure they are protected against losses in the
case other creditors are empty creditors and push the firm into default. However, if a
firm has multiple creditors, it is more able to substitute away from an empty creditor.
Hence, these two effects act to make the question of the sign of the effect of the number
of creditors a firm has on the intensity of the empty creditor effect, and empirical one.
From columns 3 and 4 in Table 6 we learn that the empty creditor effect for a firm with an
average number of creditors (9.14) is between 1.94 and 2.55 percentage points. However,
β3 is statistically insignificant, hence we can not conclude that the number of creditors
affects the intensity of the empty creditor effect. This may be due to the competition
to “empty first” offsetting the ability to substitute away from empty creditors.
8 Evidence at the Bank-Firm Level
Average empty creditor effect
As a further test, we estimate the average empty creditor effect at bank-firm level
using the following specification:
∆PDb,f = β1Treatedf + β2Zf,BA + αk + αb + εb,f (3)
Where firms, banks and sector are indexed by f , b and k, respectively. ∆PDb,f is the
change in bank b’s estimate of firm i’s probability of default after the implementation of
the law change (i.e., PDb,f,AI − PDb,f,BA). The vectors Treatedf and Zf,BA remain the
same as in the main regressions. Finally, αk and αb are sector and bank fixed effects,
respectively. As in the main regressions, β1 is expected to be negative.
The results using Equation 3 and employing the data on probability of default at
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the bank-firm level, are displayed in Table 7. To enhance comparison with the results
reported in Table 3, we weigh the observations according to the the number of banks
each firm has a credit relationship with when estimating Equation 3. This ensures firms
with many banking relationships are not over-weighted in the bank-firm regressions. We
find that CDS firms see a 1.39 to 2.83 percentage point decrease in their probability of
default when the effect of empty creditors is removed, depending on whether sector fixed
effects, bank fixed effects, or both are included or not. This is economically significant
given that the average probability of default in the entire bank-firm sample is about 1.73
percent, and represents 18% to 36% of one standard deviation (7.95 percentage points)
of the probability of default in the treatment group prior to the law change.15 These
results imply that our base results in Table 3 are robust to our decision to collapse the
data to firm level.
Intensity of the empty creditor effect
Additionally, we test the bank characteristics that are associated with an increased
empty creditor effect, by employing the following specification:
∆PDb,f = β1CDSNetNotionalb,f,BA + β2Xb,BA + β3CDSNetNotionalb,f,BAXb,BA + εb,f
(4)
Where firms and banks are indexed by f and b, respectively. ∆PDb,f is the change
in bank b’s estimate of firm i’s probability of default after the implementation of the law
change (i.e., PDb,f,AI −PDb,f,BA). CDSNetNotionalb,f,BA is equal to average CDS Net
Notional bank b purchased on firm f prior to the law change, weighted by the average
amount of credit bank b provided firm f prior to the law change. The vector Xb,BA
contains pre-announcement average bank based variables which have been demeaned:
Collateral to total credit, the bank’s liquidity ratio, capital ratio, net-interest income
to gross revenue (NII), and the banks monitoring expenses (staff and administrative
expenses).
The results for Equation 4 are displayed in Table 8. Here we learn that banks
that jointly trade CDS on their borrowers and which have more collateral attached to
the credit they provide to these firms (column 1), are less liquid (column 2), are better
capitalised (column 4), which earn a larger part of their revenue from interest generating
activities (column 3) and which spend fewer resources monitoring (column 5) recognise
a larger empty creditor effect on the firm.
In particular, a one standard deviation increase in a bank’s capital ratio (2.54%)
15In Appendix A.3, Table 19 provides descriptive statistics for the bank-firm sample.
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Table 7: Empty Creditor Effect - Base Results - Bank-Firm Level
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
∆PD ∆PD ∆PD ∆PD ∆PD ∆PD ∆PD ∆PD
CDS Reference Entity -1.401∗∗∗ -1.497∗∗ -2.758∗∗ -2.826∗∗ -1.393∗∗∗ -1.403∗∗ -2.216∗∗∗ -2.160∗∗
(-3.06) (-2.48) (-2.46) (-2.46) (-2.94) (-2.46) (-2.68) (-2.45)
Legal Size Control No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Bank FEs No No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector FEs No No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes
Observations 4357 4357 4356 4356 4344 4344 4343 4343
Adj. R2 0.000 0.000 0.044 0.044 0.099 0.098 0.141 0.141
Note: Difference-in-differences regression results for the change in probability of default, where the
regression equation is:
∆PDb,f = β1Treatedf + β2Zf,AI + αk + αb + εb,f
Where, ∆PDb,f is the change in bank b’s estimate of firm f ’s probability of default after the imple-
mentation of the law change (i.e. PDb,f,AI − PDb,f,BA). Treatedf is equal to 1 if firm f is a German
firm with CDS traded on them over the entire sample period, and equal to 0 if it never had CDS traded
on it, in the sample period. The vector Zf,AI includes a control for the legal size of firm f to control
for the effect of a particular clause in the reform that affected only firms which were classified as large
under the German Commercial Code. Finally, αb and αk are bank and sector fixed effects, respectively.
There is a 2 year window pre and post the event (i.e. 8 quarters = 0 prior, and 8 quarters = 1 after
the event. The pre-announcement period runs from 2009Q3 to 2011Q2, and the post implementation
period runs from 2012Q3 to 2014Q2. The treatment and control group are matched using the CEM
method on: firm size, book leverage, alternative z-score, and change in the probability of default in the
prior period. All regressions cluster the standard errors at sector level. t statistics are reported between
parentheses. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively.
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which jointly holds the average CDS hedge position, sees the empty creditor effect in-
crease by an extra 10 basis points. This may appear to be counter-intuitive as it may
be expected that banks that are capital constrained are more severe empty creditors in
order to convert the risky asset (the loan) into a safe asset (cash from the CDS insurance
payment). However, as this is the joint effect of a bank with the average capital ratio
which then trade CDS on their borrowers, the motive for trading CDS is less likely to
be to improve their regulatory capital. Hence, an interpretation of this result is that if
a bank trades CDS on a borrowers when it is well capitalised, the bank will recognise a
larger empty creditor effect on the firm.
Similarly, the result for the collateral to total credit variable may seem to contradict
the results from Table 6. Where the result in Table 6 indicates that a higher collateral
ratio implies a reduced empty creditor effect, the result in Table 8 indicates that if a bank
trades CDS on the borrower and jointly has more collateral attached to the credit that
they provide to a CDS referenced entity, the bank will recognise a larger empty creditor
effect on the firm. In particular, a one standard deviation increase in the collateral ratio
(52.37%) where the bank holds the average CDS hedge position, sees the empty creditor
effect increase by an extra 100 basis points. While collateral may reduce a creditors
incentive or need to trade CDS on a borrower, as it is to some degree a substitute in
laying off credit risk, collateral provides empty creditors with a larger pay-off when the
firm defaults. Hence, this result is not a contradiction to the result from Table 6 as
it does not measure the former effect, incentive to trade CDS, because the interaction
implies that the effect is conditional on the bank trading CDS on the borrower.
Finally, the variables net-interest income to gross revenue and monitoring expenses
measure different aspects of a bank’s business model. Banks with higher NII are less
likely to purchase CDS for trading purposes and thus their CDS trading behaviour is a
stronger signal of the empty creditor effect. Hence, a one standard deviation increase in
the NII ratio (16.3%) where the bank holds the average CDS hedge position, sees the
empty creditor effect increase by an extra 2.64 percentage points.
Banks that allocate a large portion of their resources to expenses associated with
monitoring are more likely to be relationship lenders which gather valuable soft infor-
mation on their borrowers over time. Hence, a one standard deviation increase in the
monitoring expense (26.82%) where the bank holds the average CDS hedge position,
sees the empty creditor effect decrease by 5.36 percentage points. This implies CDS
referenced firms which borrower from relationship lenders are mostly not affected by the
empty creditor effect.
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Table 8: Intensity of the Impact of Empty Creditors - Bank-Firm Level
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
∆PD ∆PD ∆PD ∆PD ∆PD
CDS Net Notional -0.005∗∗ -0.007∗∗ -0.010∗∗ 0.007∗ -0.011∗∗
(-2.55) (-2.25) (-2.09) (1.82) (-2.17)
Collateral / Total Credit -0.003
(-1.11)
Net Notional × Collateral / Total Credit -0.004∗∗
(-2.37)
Liquidity 0.149
(1.02)
Net Notional × Liquidity 0.002∗∗
(1.96)
NII -0.752
(-1.25)
Net Notional × NII -0.034∗
(-1.88)
Capital -0.021
(-0.32)
Net Notional × Capital -0.008∗
(-1.96)
Monitoring -0.123
(-0.16)
Net Notional × Monitoring 0.042∗∗
(2.08)
Observations 2640 4036 4031 4036 4031
Adj. R2 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
Note: Difference-in-differences regression results where the regression equation is:
∆PDb,f = β1CDSNetNotionalb,f,BA + β2Xb,BA + β3CDSNetNotionalb,f,BAXb,BA + εb,f
Where, ∆PDb,f is the change in bank b’s estimate of firm f ’s probability of default after the imple-
mentation of the law change (i.e. PDb,f,AI − PDb,f,BA). CDSNetNotionalb,f,BA is equal to average
CDS Net Notional bank b purchased on firm f prior to the law change, weighted by the average amount
of credit bank b provided firm f . The vector Xb,BA contains pre-announcement average bank based
variables: Collateral to total credit, the bank’s liquidity ratio, capital ratio, net interest income to gross
revenue (NII), and the banks monitoring expenses (staff and administrative expenses). Table 1 contains
information on each variable used in the table, including: their unit, definition, and source. There is a 2
year window pre and post the event (i.e. 8 quarters = 0 prior, and 8 quarters = 1 after the event). All
regressions cluster the standard errors at the borrower level. We report t statistics between parentheses.
∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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9 The Empty Creditor Spread
To test if the incentive for empty creditors to push CDS firms into default is priced
into CDS spreads as assumed by Bolton and Oehmke (2011), we employ the following
regression specification:
∆CDSSpreadf = β1Treatedf + β2Xf,BA + β3Zf,BA + αk + εf (5)
Here, ∆CDSSpreadf is the change in firm f ’s average 5-year MMR CDS spread after the
implementation of the law change (i.e., CDSSpreadf,AI−CDSSpreadf,BA). The vector
Zf,BA includes macroeconomic variables to control for the effect the general economic
environment on changes to the probability of default. Finally, αk are sector fixed effects.
Treatedf is equal to 1 if firm f had CDS traded on it over the entire sample period
and was a German reference entity, and equal to 0 if it has CDS traded on it but was
domiciled in another European country. The use of German non-CDS referenced entities
as a control group is not feasible for the pricing regressions as there is no CDS price for
a firm if there are CDS traded on its debt. Therefore, we define the control group in
the pricing regressions as other European CDS reference entities (i.e., European CDS
reference entities excluding German reference entities). The use of other European CDS
reference entities as a control group is motivated by the fact that they should not have
had experienced any change in their exposure to empty creditors over this time period.
The vector Xf,BA contains average, pre-announcement, firm control variables, which
includes Tobin’s Q, return on equity, volatility of assets, Altman z-score, market value
of assets and sectoral loss given default. While the treatment and control groups are
matched as in the previous regressions, we include these firm controls to further account
for any differences between German and other European CDS referenced entities.
The sign of β1 could either be positive or negative. While the removal of the impact
of empty creditors for the treated firms would cause the sign of β1 to be negative. The
fact that the restructuring clause, for treated firms, has no value before the event and
has value after the event, would cause the sign of β1 to be positive (Packer and Zhu,
2005). However, a negative β1 is evidence that the incentive for empty creditors to push
CDS firms into default is priced into CDS spreads and dominates the impact of the
restructuring clause.
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Table 9: Empty Creditor Effect In Prices
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆Spread ∆Spread ∆Spread ∆Spread
German CDS Reference Entity -49.365∗∗ -55.087∗∗ -55.804 -122.225∗∗
(-2.04) (-2.32) (-0.83) (-2.39)
Macro Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Controls No Yes No Yes
Sector FEs No No Yes Yes
Observations 92 85 54 45
Adj. R2 0.012 0.070 0.167 0.119
Note: Difference in differences regression results for the change in the 5 year CDS spread (MM), where
the regression equation is:
∆CDSSpreadf = β1Treatedf + β2Xf,BA + β3Zf,BA + αk + εf
Where, ∆CDSSpreadf is the change in a firm’s average 5-year MMR CDS spread after the implemen-
tation of the law change (i.e. CDSSpreadf,AI−CDSSpreadf,BA). The vector Xf,BA contains average,
pre-announcement, firm control variables, which includes Tobin’s Q, return on equity, volatility of as-
sets, Altman z-score, market value of assets and sectoral loss given default. Treatedf is equal to 1 if a
firm had CDS traded on them over the entire sample period and is a German reference entity, and equal
to 0 if it has CDS traded on it but is domiciled in another European country. The vector Zf,AI includes
macroeconomic variables, to control for the effect the general economic environment across countries.
Finally, αk are sector fixed effects. There is a 2 year window pre and post the event (i.e. 8 quarters = 0
prior, and 8 quarters = 1 after the event). The pre-announcement period runs from 2009Q2 to 2011Q2,
and the post implementation period runs from 2012Q3 to 2014Q1. The treatment and control group
are matched using the CEM method on: firm size, book leverage, and Altman z-score. All regressions
cluster the standard errors at sector level. t statistics are reported between parentheses. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗
indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively.
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Table 9 presents the results of estimating Equation 5, where β1 provides a joint
estimate of the effect of empty creditors and the implementation of the restructuring
clause. While statistically insignificant in one of the four specifications, all treatment
effects take a negative sign, suggesting that the effect of empty creditors dominates the
restructuring effect. We take this as evidence for the impact of empty creditors being
priced into the CDS spreads of affected reference entities.16
We find that German CDS firms saw a 49 to 122 basis point decrease in their 5 year
CDS spreads when the effect of empty creditors was removed, depending on whether
sector fixed effects, controls, or both are included. This is economically significant given
that the average 5 year CDS spread in the entire sample is about 170 basis points, and
represents 30% to 76% of one standard deviation (161 basis points) of the 5 year CDS
spread in the treatment group prior to the law change.17
10 Robustness
In this section, we first show that the treatment and control groups follow parallel
trends prior to the event. We further present results regarding several robustness tests
(matching, choice of matching variables, and length of the event window). Additionally,
we show that the results are robust to placebo testing.
Parallel trends
An assumption of the difference-in-differences methodology is that the treatment and
control group follow parallel trends prior to the the event. To investigate the validity
of this assumption, we conduct the same exercise as the main regressions using each
quarter, starting from 8 quarters before the announcement of the reform, as the event.
Figure 6 shows the parallel trends test where the bars in the graph depict the 95%
confidence interval for the treatment effect of each quarter. The assumption holds as
the treatment effect is insignificant for the quarters prior to the announcement in 2011
Q2, as the bars in the graph prior to the event cross the x-axis
16These results are robust to shortening the event window as presented in in Appendix A.3, Table 16.
In this table the pre/post event windows are narrowed to 4 quarters as opposed to 8 quarters. Using a
shorter event window, the results become more statistically significant and the beta estimates remain
negative in sign.
17In Appendix A.3, Table 20 provides descriptive statistics for the sample used in these regressions.
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Figure 6: Parallel Trends - Treatment Effect Over Time
Note: The graph represents the point estimate (grey squares) and the 95% confidence interval (black
lines) for the difference-in-differences between CDS German firms and non-CDS German firms for each
period, estimated using the following regression equation:
PDf,t = β1Treatedf,t + β2Quarter + β3TreateditQuarter
Where, the treatment variable Treatedf,t is define as 1 if the borrower is a German CDS reference
entity over the entire sample, and 0 where the borrower is a German firm with no CDS traded on it. β3
and its 95% confidence interval are plotted in the graph. The treatment and control group are matched
using the CEM method on: firm size, book leverage, alternative z-score, and change in the probability
of default in the prior period.
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Varying the matching variables
Our main results are robust to matching the treatment and control groups. The
results when not matching (i.e., taking the universe of control firms and treated firms)
are shown in columns 1 and 2 of Table 11. We notice that all treatment effects are
statistically significant, and their magnitude is economically similar to when matching.
Additionally, the results are robust to the choice of matching variables. Columns 2 to
10 of Table 11 presents results where the employed control sample varies using different
matching variables. The sign, statistical significance, and economic magnitude remain
mostly unchanged across the different combinations of matching variables. Thus, the
main results are robust to the choice of matching variables.
Alternative control group
The purpose of matching is to make the treatment and control group more similar
so as to reduce selection bias. An alternative approach to testing the robustness of
the main results to selection bias, is to use a control group that is more similar to the
treatment group. In this context, we can use European CDS firms as a control group, as
opposed to German non-CDS firms. While European CDS firms may be more similar to
German CDS firms than German non-CDS firms are, as previously discussed, the use of
European CDS firms results in the treatment effect including the ability to restructure
a firm. The main results are robust to the use of an alternative control group and are
presented in columns 1 and 2 of Table 10. Relative to the main results, we find the
results using European CDS firms as a control group to be lower in magnitude. This
may be as a result of the German CDS firms gaining the ability to restructure due to
the law change.
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 10 relate to columns 9 and 10 of Table 10. Here we test the
robustness of our finding that the CDS trading behaviour of referenced firms’ creditors
affects the intensity of the empty creditor effect. As with the main results, the use of
the different control group reduces the magnitude of the impact, where a one standard
deviation increase in the firm’s CDS hedge ratio (2.47) sees the empty creditor effect
increase by an extra 63 basis points. While the magnitude of the effects are smaller
when using European CDS firms as the control group, the sign is the same as the main
results and the effects remain statistically significant. Hence, we conclude that selection
bias is not driving the results.
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Table 10: Empty Creditor Effect - Base Results - Euro Controls
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆PD ∆PD ∆PD ∆PD
German Ref. Entity -1.041∗∗ -0.612∗ -0.791 -0.196
(-2.34) (-1.85) (-1.41) (-0.47)
Net Notional / Total Credit 0.000 -0.000∗∗∗
(0.68) (-6.39)
German Ref. Entity X Net Notional / Total Credit -0.179 -0.257∗∗
(-1.36) (-2.54)
Sector FEs No Yes No Yes
Observations 166 145 166 145
Adj. R2 0.020 -0.046 0.013 -0.033
Note: Difference in differences regression results for the change in probability of default of German
CDS reference entities relative to other European CDS firms. The regression equation is:
∆PDf = β1Treatedf + β2Xf,BA + β3TreatedfXf,BA + αk + εf
Where, ∆PDf is the change in firm f ’s average probability of default after the implementation of the
law change (i.e. PDf,AI − PDf,BA). Here the averaging is done by weighting each observation by the
percentage of the firm’s total credit provided by the reporting bank. Treatedf is equal to 1 if firm f
is a German firm with CDS traded on it over the entire sample period, and equal to 0 if firm f is a
European firm with CDS traded on it over the entire sample period. The vector Xf,BA contains the
firm’s creditors’ hedge ratio. Finally, αk are sector fixed effects. Table 1 contains information on each
variable used in the table, including: their unit, definition, and source. The event is defined as zero
before the announcement of the law in 2011 Q2 and 1 after the implementation in 2012Q3. There is a
2 year window pre and post the event (i.e. 8 quarters = 0 prior, and 8 quarters = 1 after the event).
All regressions cluster the standard errors at sector level. We report t statistics between parentheses.
∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 11: Empty Creditor Effect - Choice of Matching Variables
Matching Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Size Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Book Leverage Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Alternative Z-Score Yes Yes Yes Yes
Prior change in then Probability of Default Yes Yes
CDS Ref. Entity -2.110∗∗∗ -2.043∗∗ -1.516∗∗ -2.247∗∗∗ -1.623∗∗ -1.880∗∗ -1.711∗∗ -2.876∗∗ -1.354∗ -1.993∗∗
(-3.38) (-2.40) (-2.57) (-2.71) (-2.53) (-2.35) (-2.16) (-2.55) (-1.75) (-2.05)
Legal Size Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector FEs No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 64468 64467 2345 2339 2345 2339 1726 1720 1128 1117
Adj. R2 0.003 0.073 0.001 0.022 0.002 0.027 0.005 0.021 -0.001 0.031
Note: Difference in differences regression results for the change in probability of default of German CDS reference entities relative to other German firms. The regression
equation is:
∆PDf = β1Treatedf + β4Zf,BA + αk + εf
Where, ∆PDf is the change in firm f ’s average probability of default after the implementation of the law change (i.e. PDf,AI − PDf,BA). Here the averaging is done by
weighting each observation by the percentage of the firm’s total credit provided by the reporting bank. Treatedf is equal to 1 if firm f is a German firm with CDS traded
on them over the entire sample period, and equal to 0 if it never had CDS traded on it, in the sample period. The vector Zf,BA includes a control for the legal size of firm
f to control for the effect of a particular clause in the reform that affected only firms which were classified as large in the reform. Finally, αk are sector fixed effects. Here
the event is defined as zero before the announcement of the law in 2011 Q2 and 1 after the implementation in 2012Q3. There is a 2 year window pre and post the event (i.e.
8 quarters = 0 prior, and 8 quarters = 1 after the event). The treatment and control group are matched using the CEM method on different variables that vary across the
columns as indicated. For each variable the sample is split into quartiles and then matched on the quartile membership (e.g. treatment and control groups in the 4th quartile
of firm size). All regressions cluster the standard errors at sector level. We report t statistics between parentheses. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
level, respectively.
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Shorter event window period
A potential concern is that the main specification employs data from only those firms
that survive the whole period, i.e., survivorship bias. This is due to the fact that the
variable of interested is the change in the probability of default, requiring a probability
of default observations both before and after the event. Hence, the firms’ need to survive
the entire event window to be included in the sample. To test if this is driving the results
we shorten the event window to 1 year (4 quarters) before the announcement and 1 year
after the implementation. The results are robust to shortening the event window and
are presented in columns 3 & 4 of Table 6.
Placebo Test - Small Bang Protocol
To conduct the placebo test, we run the same analysis as the main regressions,
including the time period of averaging, and use the CDS Small Bang as the event. The
“Small Bang” brought a greater degree of standardization in the CDS market in 2009,
and spurred more trading in CDS. This is a strong placebo test as the CDS Small Bang
would have affected the treatment group, German CDS reference entities, but not the
control, German non-CDS firms. However, the impact of empty creditors should only be
affected by changes to the bankruptcy law or the CDS restructuring clause, thus there
should be no treatment effect with the Small Bang as an event. The results in the last
two columns of Table 12 confirm this as the treatment effect is statistically insignificant
across both specifications.
Averaging bank-firm level variables
While the bank-firm level results in Table 7 imply that our main results in Table 3 are
robust to our decision to average the bank-firm level data, to further test the robustness
of the main results by conducting two additional robustness tests. First, while for
the main results we took the credit weighted average of the bank-firm level variables,
as a robustness test we take the unweighted, or simple average. The results for the
main regressions using a sample constructed using unweighted averages are presented in
Table 13. We find the positive, and significant, evidence for the impact of empty creditors
remains. As all treatment effects are statistically significant, and their magnitude is
economically similar to when using credit weighted averages, we conclude that the main
results are robust to the use of weights when averaging.
Second, we use the change in the probability of default in the main results, as a
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Table 12: Empty Creditor Effect - Different Events
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Change in Change in Change in Change in CDS CDS
Bankruptcy Law Bankruptcy Law Bankruptcy Law Bankruptcy Law Small Bang Small Bang
2 Year Window 2 Year Window 1 Year Window 1 Year Window
∆PD ∆PD ∆PD ∆PD ∆PD ∆PD
CDS Ref. Entity -1.354∗ -1.993∗∗ -0.869∗ -1.441∗ -0.596 -0.746
(-1.75) (-2.05) (-1.72) (-1.75) (-1.10) (-0.99)
Legal Size Control Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Sector FEs No Yes No Yes No Yes
Adj. R2 -0.001 0.031 0.004 0.033 -0.000 0.068
Observations 1128 1117 1091 1080 774 765
Note: Difference-in-differences regression results for the change in probability of default of German
CDS reference entities relative to other German firms. The regression equation is:
∆PDf = β1Treatedf + β4Zf,BA + αk + εf
Where, ∆PDf is the change in a firm’s average probability of default after the event (i.e. PDf,A −
PDf,B). Treatedf is equal to 1 if firm f is a German firm with CDS traded on them over the entire
sample period, and equal to 0 if it never had CDS traded on it, in the sample period. The vector
Zf,BA includes a control for the legal size of firm f to control for the effect of a particular clause in
the reform that affected only firms which were classified as large under the German Commercial Code.
Finally, αk are sector fixed effects. Here the event definition varies across the columns. For columns
1-4, the event is the change to the German Bankruptcy Law in 2012 (ESUG). Where columns 1-2 the
event window is 2 years before and after the event, columns 3-4 the window is shortened to 1 year. For
columns 5-6 the CDS Small Bang is the event where 7 quarters before, and 7 quarters after the event
are employed These are averaged by firm and period (pre/post). The treatment and control group are
matched using the CEM method on: firm size, book leverage, alternative z-score, and change in the
probability of default in the prior period. All regressions cluster the standard errors at sector level. t
statistics are reported between parentheses. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels respectively.
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Table 13: Empty Creditor Effect - Base Results - Simple Averages
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆PD ∆PD ∆PD ∆PD
CDS Ref. Entity -1.454∗∗∗ -1.873∗∗ -2.165∗∗ -2.589∗∗
(-2.67) (-2.43) (-2.47) (-2.54)
Legal Size Control No Yes No Yes
Sector FEs No No Yes Yes
Observations 1167 1167 1156 1156
Adj. R2 0.000 0.005 0.030 0.034
Note: Difference in differences regression results for the change in probability of default of German
CDS reference entities relative to other German firms. The regression equation is:
∆PDf = β1Treatedf + β4Zf,BA + αk + εf
Where, ∆PDf is the change in firm f ’s average probability of default after the implementation of the
law change (i.e. PDf,AI−PDf,BA). Here the simple average is employed. Treatedf is equal to 1 if firm
f is a German firm with CDS traded on them over the entire sample period, and equal to 0 if it never
had CDS traded on it, in the sample period. The vector Zf,BA includes a control for the legal size of
firm f to control for the effect of a particular clause in the reform that affected only firms which were
classified as large under the German Commercial Code. Finally, αk are sector fixed effects. Here the
event is defined as zero before the announcement of the law in 2011 Q2 and 1 after the implementation
in 2012Q3. There is a 2 year window pre and post the event (i.e. 8 quarters = 0 prior, and 8 quarters
= 1 after the event). The treatment and control group are matched using the CEM method on: firm
size, book leverage, alternative z-score, and change in then probability of default in the prior period.
All regressions cluster the standard errors at sector level. We report t statistics between parentheses.
∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 14: Empty Creditor Effect - Base Results - No Time Averaging
(1) (2) (3) (4)
PDf,t PDf,t PDf,t PDf,t
CDS Ref. Entity -0.968 -4.319∗∗ -3.656 -5.107∗
(-1.32) (-2.94) (-1.56) (-1.95)
Post ESUG 0.550 -0.195 0.579 -0.042
(1.62) (-0.68) (1.09) (-0.10)
CDS Ref. Entity X Post ESUG -1.402∗∗∗ -0.671∗∗∗ -1.682∗∗∗ -1.075∗∗∗
(-3.50) (-10.55) (-3.83) (-2.98)
Legal Size Control No Yes No Yes
Sector FEs No No Yes Yes
Observations 10886 10886 10886 10886
Adj. R2 0.001 0.070 0.122 0.160
Note: Difference-in-differences regression results for the change in probability of default of German
CDS reference entities relative to other German firms. The regression equation is:
PDf,t = β1Treatedf + β2Post ESUGt + β3Post ESUGt Treatedf + αk + εf,t
Where, PDf,t is firm f ’s average probability of default in quarter, t. Here the averaging is done by
weighting each observation by the percentage of the firm’s total credit provided by the reporting bank.
Post ESUGt is equal to zero for 8 quarters before the announcement of the law in 2011 Q2 and one
for 8 quarters after the implementation in 2012Q3. Treatedf is equal to 1 if firm f is a German firm
with CDS traded on them over the entire sample period, and equal to 0 if it never had CDS traded
on it, in the sample period. The vector Zf,BA includes a control for the legal size of firm f to control
for the effect of a particular clause in the reform that affected only firms which were classified as large
under the German Commercial Code. Finally, αk are sector fixed effects. The treatment and control
group are matched using the CEM method on: firm size, book leverage, alternative z-score, and change
in the probability of default in the prior period. All regressions cluster the standard errors at sector
and quarter level. We report t statistics between parentheses. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the
10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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robustness test we use the level, or non-time-averaged data. To do so, we employ an
alternative difference-in-differences specification:
PDf,t = β1Treatedf +β2PostESUGt +β3TreatedfPostESUGt +β4Zf +αk + εf,t (6)
where firms and quarters are indexed by f and t, respectively. PDf,t is firm f ’s
average probability of default in quarter t. Treatedf is equal to 1 if a firm f had
CDS traded on it over the entire sample period, and equal to 0 if it never had CDS
traded on it, in the sample period. Post ESUGt is equal to 1 for 8 quarters after the
implementation in 2012Q3 and 0 for 8 quarters before the announcement of the law in
2011 Q2. Finally, αk are sector fixed effects and εf,t is an error term. In all regressions,
the standard errors are clustered at sector level to account for the correlation structure
of the errors (Petersen, 2009).
The results in Table 14 indicate that the main results are robust to using pre/post
averages, as all treatment effects are statistically significant, and their magnitude is
economically similar to the main results. Further, the large t-statistics for the difference-
in-differences estimates, β3, relative to those from the main result may indicate the
need to account for the serial correlation of the standard errors as is done in the main
regressions.
11 Conclusion
Firms having credit-default swaps (CDS) traded on them may face “empty creditors”.
Indeed, CDS allow creditors to undo their economic exposure to credit deterioration.
This paper investigates the importance of empty creditors by employing a quasi-natural
experiment, i.e., a change in German bankruptcy law, that removes the impact of empty
creditors.
We find that the removal of the effect of empty creditors following the change in
bankruptcy law leads to a reduction in the probability of default for CDS firms of
about 2 percentage points. Additionally, we find that the impact of empty creditors as
measured through the drop in the probability of default increases in the average CDS
hedge position of its creditors. Specifically, the empty creditor effect for a firm with
an average CDS hedge ratio (0.05) is between 1.05 and 1.49 percentage points, where
a one standard deviation increase in the firm’s CDS hedge ratio (2.47) sees the empty
creditor effect increase by an extra 1.1 percentage points. Further, we find that firms
with less concentrated debt, longer credit relationships and firms with higher average
collateral ratios of their debt are less affected by empty creditors. While financially risky
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firms are severely affected by empty creditors, safe firms are not affected. Finally, we
find that bank’s which are not capital constrained, which monitor their borrowers less,
earn a smaller portion of their income from interest activities, and which are liquidity
constrained recognise the empty creditor effect to a larger extent.
We account for endogeneity issues which affects the extant literature by employing
an exogenous shock to the bankruptcy law of Germany, specifically changes to the re-
structuring law. We are, therefore, able to identify the direct effect of CDS trading on
a firm’s probability of default.
While CDS have been subject to intense criticism, the current lack of understanding
of the actual social benefit and costs of CDS, as well as what causes CDS to have
these costs and benefits, makes it difficult for policy makers to determine appropriate
regulation. While this paper finds evidence for a negative side effect of CDS trading,
this does not necessarily mean regulators should aim to reduce the level of CDS trading.
On the contrary, CDS may still have large benefits from a risk diversification point of
view for banks and, thus improve the credit supply to these CDS firms. However, this
paper shows the conditions which cause a negative side-effect, empty creditors, and that
it can be removed.
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A Appendix
A.1 Credit default swap contracts
A credit default swap (CDS) contract is similar to an insurance contract where one
party pays another party for protection from a particular event.18 In the case of CDS,
a protection buyer (buyer of the CDS) makes periodic payments to the protection seller
(seller of the CDS) and the protection seller pays the buyer a protection value if a “credit
event” occurs. The CDS contract specifies the parties (protection buyer and seller) as
well as the reference entity on which credit risk protection is being purchased. Further,
it specifies the maturity, which ranges from 2 to 10 years, with the most liquid being
5-year maturity. Further, CDS contracts define what the parties agree to be a credit
event (restructuring or bankruptcy), which triggers a payment from the protection seller
to the protection buyer. For this protection, the CDS buyer pays a periodic premium to
the protection seller, called the CDS spread. Once the event occurs a settlement takes
place where the value of the compensation that the protection buyer receives from the
seller is determined. Finally, the contract specifies the way in which this payment from
the protection seller to buyer is to be settled. This can be done through a cash settlement
where the protection buyer receives the difference between the protection value and the
current value of the underlying debt,19 or by physical settlement, where the protection
buyer delivers a certain bond of the the reference entity to the seller and receives the
full insured amount in cash, in return (ISDA, 2003).
Clearly, there are many points that could potentially be negotiated in these bilateral
contracts. This could harm the liquidity of the CDS market, as parties would have to
negotiate these before entering into agreements. To address this, the International Swap
and Derivative Association release the 2003 ISDA Credit Definitions which aimed to
standardize many of the contract terms and thus improve liquidity in the CDS market
(ISDA, 2003). These contracts were standardized by reference entity type and location of
the reference entity. For the single name corporate CDS (CDS where the reference entity
is a single firm) there are two main standardized contracts, the Standard European Cor-
porate CDS Contract and the Standard North American CDS Contract (ISDA, 009a,b).
The choice of contract is determined by the location of the reference entity (i.e.,A CDS
contract on a European firm trades with a Standard European Corporate CDS contract).
The main difference between European CDS contracts and North American CDS
18CDS differ from standard insurance contracts as a protection buyer does not need to hold the under-
lying asset and it may purchase protection that exceeds the value of its position in the underlying.
This can be thought of as buying insurance on your neighbour’s house, or insuring your own home
for more than its worth.
19The residual value of the underlying debt is typically determined by polling the dealers in the market.
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Figure 7: CDS Contract Payment Diagram
Note: This figure illustrates the payment structure of a CDS contract. A protection buyer (buyer of
the CDS) makes periodic payments (CDS Spread) to the protection seller (seller of the CDS). The
protection seller pays the buyer a protection value if a “credit event” occurs. The definition of a “credit
event” depends of the standardized contract used, which is determined based on the domicile country
of the underlying reference entity. A single-name CDS contract on a firm domiciled in Germany trades
with a European standard CDS contact which specifies restructuring as a credit event.
contracts is their definition of a credit event, called the restructuring clause. Under the
2003 ISDA Credit Definitions, there are four types of restructuring clauses: Old Restruc-
turing (CR), Modified Restructuring (MR), Modified-Modified Restructuring (MMR),
and No Restructuring (XR). European corporate CDS mostly trade with a MMR re-
structuring clause where restructuring is recognised as a credit event and the deliverable
obligation is limited to debt with a maturity no more than 60 months for restructured
obligations and 30 months for all other obligations. Prior to 2009 most North Ameri-
can corporate CDS contracts traded with a MR restructuring clause, which limits the
deliverable obligation to debt with a maturity no more than 30 months. However, in
2009, with the CDS Big Bang protocol, the restructuring clause was standardized and
changed to XR for North American CDS corporates (Markit, 009a).
In 2009 the ISDA further standardized both European CDS corporate and North
American CDS corporate contracts. The CDS Big Bang was implemented in April 2009,
while the CDS Small Bang was implemented in June 2009. The CDS Big Bang Protocol
further standardized the contracts of North American CDS corporate contracts, while
the CDS Small Bang Protocol did the same to European CDS corporate contracts. Both
standard contracts had terms changed to improve the liquidity of the respective CDS
markets, these changes included standardization of the settlement auctions, amongst
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other changes (Markit, 009a,b). The main difference between the changes is that the
North American contract was standardized to trade only with an XR restructuring
clause, while the European contract’s restructuring clause remained MMR.
A.2 German insolvency law & reform
The Insolvency Act (Insolvenzordung - hereafter InsO) governs all insolvency pro-
ceedings in Germany. InsO came into force on 1 January 1999, and has since been
amended on occasion, with the Act for the Further Facilitation of the Restructuring of
Companies (ESUG) being the last major reform. Other amendments include an amend-
ment to the personal insolvency code regarding the discharge of residual debt, in July
2014, as well as a reform to the insolvency code that governs group insolvencies, in
March 2015 (Erb and Tashiro, 2014, 2016).
When InsO was introduced in 1999 to modernize Germany’s Bankruptcy code, it re-
placed the existing liquidation-orientated code with a code that allowed for the potential
for distressed firms to be restructured, amongst other changes. While the enactment of
InsO achieved a modernisation of the Germany bankruptcy code, the cumbersome and
costly process and the complex requirements for debt-equity swaps (a key tool in restruc-
turing) meant that the ability for distressed firms to restructure and continue operating
was still severely hindered (Halladay and Jark, 2012).
This deficiency was made clear with the enactment of the European Insolvency Reg-
ulation (EIR) adopted by the EU Council in May 2002. This resulted in the Germany
Insolvency law becoming less attractive relative to other European insolvency regimes.
The EIR entitles firms to file for insolvency in any member state in which they have an
establishment for assets, while the main insolvency proceedings has to be commenced
where a firms Centre of Main Interest (COMI) is located. A firm’s COMI is determined
by the location of its registered office, in the absence of proof to the contrary (i.e., its
COMI is located in another jurisdiction). Thus, a firm could potentially move its COMI
to another member state where the bankruptcy law is more favourable to the firm. How-
ever, this is unlikely to happen as it is costly for firms to move their COMI and may be
rebutted (Kaczor, 2010), and indeed it remained rare for firms to change their COMI.
Therefore, although the enactment of the regulation, did not, in general, cause firms to
move their COMI, it made the deficiency clear which the German Bundestag (German
parliament) aimed to address by reforming InsO.
The German Bundestag aimed to reform InsO to improve restructuring and recap-
italization opportunities for firms, and thus make German Insolvency more attractive
compared to foreign insolvency regimes (Dimmling, 2015). In 2012, German insolvency
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law was substantially reformed by the so-called ESUG reform act (i.e., Gesetz zur weit-
eren Erleichterung der Sanierung von Unternehmen). ESUG was initially developed in
September 2010, announced in March 2011, passed in by the German Bundestag in De-
cember 2011, and came into effect in March 2012. Although a full year passed between
its first draft and it being passed in parliament there was uncertainty as to when it
would be passed and the exact details to be included in the reform (Closset and Urban,
2018).
ESUG made five major modifications to the German Insolvency Regulation. The
reform made preliminary creditor committees (PCC) mandatory for large companies and
possible for smaller companies at the request of the debtor. Additionally, it extended the
already existing right of the creditors’ meeting to choose an insolvency administrator for
the PCC. Further, the reform strengthened existing insolvency plan proceedings as well
as created new instruments to support self administration. Lastly, the reform allowed for
the possibility of a debt-equity-swap as a part of an insolvency plan. Overall, the reform
made insolvency proceedings in Germany more effective and predictable, and changed
the “liquidation culture” to a more “rescue culture” (Erb and Tashiro, 2014).
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A.3 Supplementary tables
Table 15: Empty Creditor Effect - Full Distribution Quartile Separation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Full Sample Quartile 1 Quartile 2 Quartile 3 Quartile 4
∆PD ∆PD ∆PD ∆PD ∆PD
CDS Reference Entity -1.308∗∗ -0.168 -0.873∗ -2.702∗∗∗ -6.008∗∗
(-2.20) (-1.16) (-1.88) (-3.29) (-2.13)
Legal Size Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1128 363 404 205 156
Control Firms 1088 349 386 201 152
Treated Firms 40 14 18 4 4
Adj. R2 0.000 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.004
Note: Difference in differences regression results for the change in probability of default, where the
regression equation is: The regression equation is ∆PDf = β1Treatedf + β4Zf,BA + εf Where, ∆PDf
is the change in firm f ’s average probability of default after the implementation of the law change (i.e.
PDf,AI −PDf,BA). Here the averaging is done by weighting each observation by the percentage of the
firm’s total credit provided by the reporting bank. Treatedf is equal to 1 if firm f is a German firm
with CDS traded on them over the entire sample period, and equal to 0 if it never had CDS traded
on it, in the sample period. The vector Zf,BA includes a control for the legal size of firm f to control
for the effect of a particular clause in the reform that affected only firms which were classified as large
under the German Commercial Code. Here the event is defined as zero before the announcement of the
law in 2011 Q2 and 1 after the implementation in 2012Q3. There is a 2 year window pre and post the
event (i.e. 8 quarters = 0 prior, and 8 quarters = 1 after the event). The treatment and control group
are matched using the CEM method on: firm size, book leverage, alternative z-score, and change in the
probability of default in the prior period. All regressions cluster the standard errors at sector level. In
column 1 the full sample is used. In column 2-5 only those firms in the indicated quartile of PDi,AI
are included. We report t statistics between parentheses. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%,
5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 16: Empty Creditor Effect In Prices - 4 Quarter Event Window
(1) (2) (3) (4)
∆Spread ∆Spread ∆Spread ∆Spread
German CDS Reference Entity -71.40∗∗∗ -81.53∗∗∗ -106.00∗ -154.48∗∗
(-4.97) (-4.44) (-1.98) (-2.78)
Macro Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm Controls No Yes No Yes
Sector FEs No No Yes Yes
Observations 105 98 65 55
Adj. R2 0.064 0.071 -0.039 -0.126
Note: Difference in differences regression results for the change in the 5 year CDS spread (MM), where
the regression equation is:
∆CDSSpreadf = β1Treatedf + β2Xf,BA + β3Zf,BA + αk + εf
Where, ∆CDSSpreadf is the change in a firm’s average 5-year MMR CDS spread after the implemen-
tation of the law change (i.e. CDSSpreadf,AI−CDSSpreadf,BA). The vector Xf,BA contains average,
pre-announcement, firm control variables, which includes Tobin’s Q, return on equity, volatility of as-
sets, Altman z-score, market value of assets and sectoral loss given default. Treatedf is equal to 1 if a
firm had CDS traded on them over the entire sample period and is a German reference entity, and equal
to 0 if it has CDS traded on it but is domiciled in another European country. The vector Zf,AI includes
macroeconomic variables, to control for the effect the general economic environment across countries.
Finally, αk are sector fixed effects. There is a 1 year window pre and post the event (i.e. 4 quarters = 0
prior, and 4 quarters = 1 after the event). The pre-announcement period runs from 2010Q3 to 2011Q2,
and the post implementation period runs from 2012Q3 to 2013Q2. The treatment and control group
are matched using the CEM method on: firm size, book leverage, and Altman z-score. All regressions
cluster the standard errors at sector level. t statistics are reported between parentheses. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗
indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels respectively.
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Table 17: Descriptive Statistics: German Reference Entity Vs. German Non-Reference Entity - Unmatched
Control - German Firms with No CDS Traded Treatment - German Firms with CDS Traded
Count Mean Std. Dev P10 P25 P50 P75 P90 Count Mean Std. Dev P10 P25 P50 P75 P90
Probability of Default 64428 6.06 18.56 0.03 0.23 0.79 2.28 8.17 40 1.45 3.49 0.10 0.17 0.32 0.55 3.26
Firm Size 9340 10.13 1.60 8.28 9.09 9.99 11.08 12.21 40 16.27 1.08 14.87 15.36 16.30 17.24 17.84
Book Leverage 9340 75.35 137.50 44.99 59.68 74.17 87.16 97.13 40 64.36 16.50 43.82 53.76 65.97 77.13 83.31
Alternative Z-Score 9340 2.31 2.42 0.19 0.93 2.06 3.25 4.62 40 0.58 0.52 0.05 0.26 0.51 0.78 1.12
∆ Probability of Default 64428 1.26 15.57 -1.40 -0.19 0.00 0.19 1.59 40 -0.32 1.22 -1.76 -0.18 -0.04 0.02 0.11
Before Tangible Asset Ratio 9340 34.15 29.94 1.80 8.42 25.44 53.78 86.38 40 6.04 11.35 0.01 0.18 1.61 7.15 18.38
Announcement Firm Credit Concentration 64428 23520.25 3782930.92 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.81 40 1.21 5.18 0.02 0.05 0.12 0.44 1.65
of Change in Net Working Capital / TA 9340 5.49 65.76 -24.04 -6.88 5.85 23.02 39.81 40 -1.33 19.45 -23.35 -16.07 -3.74 8.70 18.50
Bankruptcy Law Retained Earnings / TA 9340 10.19 37.21 -1.79 0.00 3.69 21.73 39.31 40 14.70 11.06 4.36 9.46 11.24 20.24 30.78
EBIT / TA 9340 6.16 17.12 -2.36 1.03 4.78 10.55 18.37 40 3.89 3.59 0.34 1.55 3.69 5.40 9.14
Sales / TA 9340 190.09 209.40 13.27 69.68 152.56 254.70 390.25 40 26.02 37.90 0.00 0.00 5.71 40.50 77.05
Length of Credit Relationship 64428 17.99 16.39 2.00 4.50 12.50 27.50 43.50 40 21.65 7.27 12.98 16.32 20.63 27.42 32.31
# Credit Relationships 64428 1.88 2.31 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 3.38 40 66.39 56.53 19.38 28.63 43.31 89.19 140.75
Collateral / Total Credit 53443 89.71 1149.17 3.29 33.14 70.81 99.79 116.51 40 11.33 12.89 0.55 1.60 6.22 16.01 24.71
Net Notional / Total Credit 64428 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 40 1.40 2.47 -0.27 0.04 0.36 2.65 4.26
Probability of Default 64428 8.74 24.28 0.04 0.19 0.64 2.32 15.75 40 0.56 1.16 0.08 0.11 0.16 0.41 1.10
Firm Size 8657 10.27 1.60 8.38 9.20 10.15 11.26 12.36 38 16.42 1.07 15.02 15.51 16.40 17.32 17.97
Book Leverage 8657 70.76 40.21 40.72 56.12 71.09 84.76 95.44 38 60.98 17.71 39.03 49.67 61.74 72.15 81.65
Alternative Z-Score 8657 2.33 2.26 0.27 0.94 2.10 3.25 4.55 38 0.59 0.57 -0.05 0.29 0.51 0.78 1.41
After Tangible Asset Ratio 8657 34.34 29.97 1.66 8.73 25.58 53.97 86.67 38 5.86 12.41 0.01 0.09 1.19 6.55 14.33
Implementation Firm Credit Concentration 64428 9814.45 1746969.98 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.04 40 0.78 2.68 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.18 1.24
of Change in Net Working Capital / TA 8657 6.42 41.59 -23.91 -6.74 5.97 23.89 40.97 38 -5.77 18.81 -26.38 -16.58 -5.84 2.14 12.97
Bankruptcy Law Retained Earnings / TA 8657 12.07 30.12 -0.47 0.00 4.77 25.39 44.08 38 17.34 13.46 4.46 9.21 13.67 22.05 30.68
EBIT / TA 8657 6.37 13.22 -1.86 1.20 4.87 10.39 17.69 38 4.91 5.15 0.67 2.61 3.46 6.22 11.86
Sales / TA 8657 187.57 197.06 13.41 64.42 151.95 253.86 383.86 38 25.34 38.94 0.00 0.00 1.13 42.28 73.46
Length of Credit Relationship 64428 23.53 18.17 4.06 10.06 18.78 33.00 50.51 40 24.09 8.86 12.54 17.49 23.61 31.77 35.68
# Credit Relationships 64428 1.95 2.76 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 3.50 40 82.09 76.67 16.13 26.69 74.19 110.50 146.00
Collateral / Total Credit 53335 102.44 1572.10 10.33 41.08 75.81 99.82 117.88 40 21.67 25.50 1.07 2.69 5.65 43.72 63.38
Net Notional / Total Credit 64428 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 40 0.78 2.07 -0.42 -0.04 0.40 1.22 2.24
Note: The table contains the sample statistics split by treatment and control group, and by time (before announcement, after implementation). There is a 2 year window pre and post the event (i.e. 8
quarters = 0 prior, and 8 quarters = 1 after the event). The pre-announcement period runs from 2009Q2 to 2011Q2, and the post implementation period runs from 2012Q3 to 2014Q1. The treatment group
is comprised of German firms which had CDS traded on them both before the implementation and after the announcement of the law change. The control group is comprised of German firms which never
had CDS traded on them in the sample period. Each observation represents the average value for the firm in the respective period (e.g. 40 observations of treated companies prior to the announcement
represents 40 firms’ average value for probability of default prior to the announcement of the law change) Table 1 contains information on each variable used in the table, including: their unit, definition,
and source.
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Table 18: Descriptive Statistics: German Reference Entity Vs. German Non-Reference Entity - Simple Weights
Control - German Firms with No CDS Traded Treatment - German Firms with CDS Traded
Count Mean Std. Dev P10 P25 P50 P75 P90 Count Mean Std. Dev P10 P25 P50 P75 P90
Probability of Default 1127 1.99 7.49 0.09 0.17 0.39 1.06 2.97 40 1.79 3.62 0.13 0.24 0.59 1.30 4.75
Firm Size 1127 12.30 1.02 11.22 11.53 12.06 12.77 13.79 40 16.27 1.08 14.87 15.36 16.30 17.24 17.84
Book Leverage 1127 63.94 18.33 40.79 52.80 65.72 76.83 84.90 40 64.36 16.50 43.82 53.76 65.97 77.13 83.31
Alternative Z-Score 1127 0.68 0.64 0.03 0.30 0.60 0.89 1.57 40 0.58 0.52 0.05 0.26 0.51 0.78 1.12
∆ Probability of Default 1127 0.04 8.09 -0.71 -0.16 -0.02 0.04 0.48 40 0.23 2.14 -1.18 -0.13 -0.04 0.02 2.09
Before Tangible Asset Ratio 1127 54.29 36.46 1.02 14.54 66.44 89.92 93.10 40 6.04 11.35 0.01 0.18 1.61 7.15 18.38
Announcement Firm Credit Concentration 1127 9.64 111.96 0.02 0.57 3.50 9.22 16.27 40 0.82 3.17 0.01 0.04 0.10 0.36 1.22
of Change in Net Working Capital / TA 1127 -2.23 17.62 -21.17 -8.70 -1.32 4.29 16.38 40 -1.33 19.45 -23.35 -16.07 -3.74 8.70 18.50
Bankruptcy Law Retained Earnings / TA 1127 13.70 19.32 -0.11 0.21 9.91 25.87 40.84 40 14.70 11.06 4.36 9.46 11.24 20.24 30.78
EBIT / TA 1127 2.16 6.70 -2.35 0.31 1.51 5.03 8.77 40 3.89 3.59 0.34 1.55 3.69 5.40 9.14
Sales / TA 1127 43.87 51.42 4.55 12.03 17.85 66.55 120.57 40 26.02 37.90 0.00 0.00 5.71 40.50 77.05
Length of Credit Relationship 1127 24.67 14.37 5.85 12.72 24.05 34.53 44.55 40 13.89 4.23 9.44 10.93 13.23 15.39 18.93
# Credit Relationships 1127 6.79 7.44 1.75 3.00 5.13 7.88 11.75 40 66.39 56.53 19.38 28.63 43.31 89.19 140.75
Collateral / Total Credit 1044 91.39 318.76 6.44 35.60 79.18 105.06 137.87 40 31.66 28.70 3.94 8.45 23.29 44.28 59.58
Net Notional / Total Credit 1127 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 40 78.33 1061.42 -5.24 -0.05 0.87 10.74 226.19
Probability of Default 1127 2.50 11.03 0.07 0.13 0.32 0.89 3.01 40 0.84 1.33 0.12 0.16 0.39 0.86 1.56
Size 1048 12.36 1.02 11.30 11.60 12.14 12.85 13.84 38 16.42 1.07 15.02 15.51 16.40 17.32 17.97
Book Leverage 1048 63.16 23.18 39.97 51.82 64.18 75.72 84.06 38 60.98 17.71 39.03 49.67 61.74 72.15 81.65
Alternative Z-Score 1048 0.71 0.69 0.01 0.33 0.64 0.93 1.63 38 0.59 0.57 -0.05 0.29 0.51 0.78 1.41
After Tangible Asset Ratio 1048 55.60 36.29 1.29 16.85 69.85 89.75 92.95 38 5.86 12.41 0.01 0.09 1.19 6.55 14.33
Implementation Firm Credit Concentration 1127 8.55 54.28 0.00 0.33 3.22 9.35 15.94 40 0.56 1.86 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.15 0.95
of Change in Net Working Capital / TA 1048 -2.42 22.42 -20.70 -7.61 -1.74 3.87 17.10 38 -5.77 18.81 -26.38 -16.58 -5.84 2.14 12.97
Bankruptcy Law Retained Earnings / TA 1048 15.26 28.58 0.00 0.47 11.77 27.06 43.67 38 17.34 13.46 4.46 9.21 13.67 22.05 30.68
EBIT / TA 1048 2.76 7.05 -1.16 0.52 1.76 4.85 9.68 38 4.91 5.15 0.67 2.61 3.46 6.22 11.86
Sales / TA 1048 43.50 51.80 4.35 12.38 16.99 64.42 122.43 38 25.34 38.94 0.00 0.00 1.13 42.28 73.46
Length of Credit Relationship 1127 28.10 16.87 7.64 13.98 26.41 39.33 51.14 40 14.40 4.71 8.42 10.25 15.20 17.06 20.92
# Credit Relationships 1127 7.65 11.71 1.86 3.13 5.38 7.88 12.50 40 82.09 76.67 16.13 26.69 74.19 110.50 146.00
Collateral / Total Credit 1039 89.88 139.37 10.88 45.94 87.21 108.22 136.20 40 67.49 76.78 4.20 11.25 36.10 94.47 181.40
Net Notional / Total Credit 1127 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 40 -20.45 180.31 -18.54 -1.09 0.24 4.07 23.47
Note: The table contains the sample statistics split by treatment and control group, and by time (before announcement, after implementation). There is a 2 year window pre and post the event (i.e. 8
quarters = 0 prior, and 8 quarters = 1 after the event). The pre-announcement period runs from 2009Q2 to 2011Q2, and the post implementation period runs from 2012Q3 to 2014Q1. The treatment
group is comprised of German firms which had CDS traded on them both before the implementation and after the announcement of the law change. The control group is comprised of German firms which
never had CDS traded on them in the sample period. The treatment and control group are matched using the CEM method on: firm size, book leverage, alternative z-score, and change in the probability
of default in the prior period. Each observation represents the average value for the firm in the respective period (e.g. 40 observations of treated companies prior to the announcement represents 40 firms’
average value for probability of default prior to the announcement of the law change) Table 1 contains information on each variable used in the table, including: their unit, definition, and source.
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Table 19: Descriptive Statistics: German Reference Entity Vs. German Non-Reference Entity - Bank-Firm
Control - German Firms with No CDS Traded Treatment - German Firms with CDS Traded
Count Mean Std. Dev P10 P25 P50 P75 P90 Count Mean Std. Dev P10 P25 P50 P75 P90
Probability of Default 3721 1.82 8.64 0.03 0.09 0.27 0.79 2.12 636 1.73 7.95 0.03 0.10 0.24 0.54 2.69
Firm Size 3721 12.30 1.02 11.22 11.53 12.08 12.78 13.82 636 16.27 1.07 14.87 15.36 16.30 17.24 17.84
Book Leverage 3721 64.25 17.84 41.75 52.94 65.79 76.91 84.90 636 64.36 16.30 43.82 53.76 65.97 77.13 83.31
Alternative Z-Score 3721 0.67 0.64 0.02 0.30 0.60 0.89 1.57 636 0.58 0.51 0.05 0.26 0.51 0.78 1.12
∆ Probability of Default 3721 -0.11 7.57 -0.22 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.13 636 -0.45 8.95 -0.26 -0.05 0.00 0.00 0.12
Before Tangible Asset Ratio 3721 54.70 36.23 1.35 15.61 67.40 89.92 93.07 636 6.04 11.22 0.01 0.18 1.61 7.15 18.38
Announcement Firm Credit Concentration 3721 9.77 113.30 0.03 0.61 3.51 9.22 16.27 636 0.82 3.13 0.01 0.04 0.10 0.36 1.22
of Change in Net Working Capital / TA 3721 -2.41 17.33 -21.17 -8.81 -1.36 4.15 15.58 636 -1.33 19.22 -23.35 -16.07 -3.74 8.70 18.50
Bankruptcy Law Retained Earnings / TA 3721 13.77 19.24 -0.02 0.27 9.99 25.75 40.80 636 14.70 10.93 4.36 9.46 11.24 20.24 30.78
EBIT / TA 3721 2.17 6.70 -2.35 0.31 1.47 5.01 8.82 636 3.89 3.55 0.34 1.55 3.69 5.40 9.14
Sales / TA 3721 43.94 51.41 4.77 12.08 17.85 66.55 119.80 636 26.02 37.45 0.00 0.00 5.71 40.50 77.05
Length of Credit Relationship 3721 23.24 21.66 1.50 4.00 16.50 36.50 61.50 636 19.07 19.98 1.50 3.50 11.50 27.50 52.50
# Credit Relationships 3721 6.89 7.50 2.00 3.13 5.25 8.00 11.88 636 66.39 55.87 19.38 28.63 43.31 89.19 140.75
Collateral / Total Credit 2378 107.52 1110.08 0.06 48.88 96.94 103.06 130.36 262 29.34 52.37 0.00 0.00 1.40 36.14 100.00
Net Notional / Total Credit 3721 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 636 475.87 6928.40 -3.93 0.00 0.00 0.00 17.40
Probability of Default 3721 2.43 11.52 0.04 0.07 0.22 0.69 2.32 636 0.94 3.74 0.03 0.08 0.17 0.45 1.52
Firm Size 3524 12.37 1.02 11.30 11.61 12.14 12.86 13.86 624 16.42 1.06 15.02 15.51 16.40 17.32 17.97
Book Leverage 3524 63.53 22.87 40.72 52.08 64.41 75.75 83.96 624 60.98 17.49 39.03 49.67 61.74 72.15 81.65
Alternative Z-Score 3524 0.71 0.69 0.01 0.33 0.64 0.93 1.65 624 0.59 0.56 -0.05 0.29 0.51 0.78 1.41
After Tangible Asset Ratio 3524 56.05 36.02 1.46 18.09 70.21 89.71 92.95 624 5.86 12.26 0.01 0.09 1.19 6.55 14.33
Implementation Firm Credit Concentration 3721 8.64 54.91 0.00 0.36 3.30 9.58 15.99 636 0.56 1.84 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.15 0.95
of Change in Net Working Capital / TA 3524 -2.58 22.31 -20.64 -7.61 -1.75 3.69 16.81 624 -5.77 18.57 -26.38 -16.58 -5.84 2.14 12.97
Bankruptcy Law Retained Earnings / TA 3524 15.39 28.56 0.00 0.52 11.77 27.29 43.61 624 17.34 13.29 4.46 9.21 13.67 22.05 30.68
EBIT / TA 3524 2.80 7.08 -1.10 0.52 1.76 4.91 9.76 624 4.91 5.09 0.67 2.61 3.46 6.22 11.86
Sales / TA 3524 43.62 51.84 4.85 12.43 17.07 64.33 121.91 624 25.34 38.45 0.00 0.00 1.13 42.28 73.46
Length of Credit Relationship 3721 30.85 24.15 2.40 10.50 24.50 45.43 72.50 636 23.23 22.57 1.50 4.50 17.00 34.50 57.57
# Credit Relationships 3721 7.77 11.83 2.00 3.13 5.38 8.00 12.63 636 82.09 75.77 16.13 26.69 74.19 110.50 146.00
Collateral / Total Credit 2341 110.71 788.66 6.90 58.41 97.15 104.41 137.17 226 42.87 63.91 0.00 0.00 7.24 65.29 141.16
Net Notional / Total Credit 3721 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 636 12.68 297.00 -9.25 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.22
Note: The table contains the sample statistics split by treatment and control group, and by time (before announcement, after implementation). There is a 2 year window pre and post the event (i.e. 8
quarters = 0 prior, and 8 quarters = 1 after the event). The pre-announcement period runs from 2009Q2 to 2011Q2, and the post implementation period runs from 2012Q3 to 2014Q1. The treatment group
is comprised of German firms which had CDS traded on them both before the implementation and after the announcement of the law change. The control group is comprised of German firms which never
had CDS traded on them in the sample period. The treatment and control group are matched using the CEM method on: firm size, book leverage, alternative z-score, and change in the probability of
default in the prior period. Each observation represents the average value for the firm or the bank firm variable in the respective period (e.g. 636 observations of treated companies prior to the announcement
represents 636 banks’ estimate of the firms’ average value for probability of default prior to the announcement of the law change) Table 1 contains information on each variable used in the table, including:
their unit, definition, and source.
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Table 20: Descriptive Statistics: German Reference Entity Vs. European Reference Entity
Control - German Firms with No CDS Traded Treatment - German Firms with CDS Traded
Count Mean Std. Dev P10 P25 P50 P75 P90 Count Mean Std. Dev P10 P25 P50 P75 P90
Spread 67 165.20 148.16 62.62 76.39 109.77 232.51 302.17 26 181.33 161.01 55.15 65.45 143.16 221.66 382.00
Firm Size 67 9.89 1.32 8.32 8.69 9.84 10.95 11.70 26 9.93 1.23 8.14 8.90 9.94 10.50 11.81
Before Book Leverage 67 27.61 11.84 14.88 21.10 24.24 33.85 44.90 26 26.23 10.68 14.56 19.63 23.16 31.55 41.07
Announcement Alternative Z-Score 67 0.49 0.51 -0.04 0.30 0.49 0.70 0.89 26 0.47 0.42 0.16 0.39 0.51 0.67 0.93
of Change in Loss Given Default 65 0.61 0.09 0.52 0.54 0.63 0.72 0.72 26 0.61 0.10 0.50 0.54 0.63 0.72 0.72
Bankruptcy Law Return on Equity 65 28.06 97.82 1.96 7.02 11.06 16.85 29.40 26 11.70 7.65 4.12 6.54 10.74 14.57 19.52
Volatility of Assets 64 4.91 13.02 0.54 0.73 1.50 2.54 10.03 25 2.01 1.54 0.63 0.76 1.44 2.66 3.72
Market Value of Assets 63 9.90 1.18 8.48 9.05 9.80 10.83 11.76 25 10.04 1.20 8.42 9.06 10.00 10.64 11.85
Spread 67 158.16 132.14 65.74 73.92 111.86 181.49 303.16 26 126.26 75.22 51.60 75.89 92.41 172.65 226.10
Firm Size 67 9.95 1.32 8.35 8.77 9.95 11.02 11.81 26 10.07 1.24 8.47 9.06 10.13 10.54 11.82
After Book Leverage 66 26.77 12.07 14.19 20.10 23.98 34.66 42.59 26 23.63 11.16 13.70 15.34 21.72 30.69 37.81
Implementation Alternative Z-Score 66 0.52 0.48 -0.09 0.24 0.58 0.80 0.92 26 0.59 0.34 0.28 0.43 0.54 0.80 1.08
of Change in Loss Given Default 65 0.65 0.14 0.56 0.56 0.57 0.76 0.92 26 0.61 0.11 0.41 0.57 0.58 0.76 0.76
Bankruptcy Law Return on Equity 63 14.46 33.09 -1.67 6.11 11.02 17.19 22.82 26 11.08 8.42 -2.52 4.52 12.34 17.43 19.13
Volatility of Assets 66 5.66 19.21 0.42 0.63 1.69 3.12 7.87 26 1.79 1.50 0.62 0.84 1.40 2.36 2.77
Market Value of Assets 63 10.02 1.18 8.49 9.05 10.09 10.91 11.83 26 10.20 1.20 8.43 9.20 10.20 10.82 11.87
Note: The table contains the sample statistics split by treatment and control group, and by time (before announcement, after implementation). There is a 2 year window pre and post the event (i.e. 8
quarters = 0 prior, and 8 quarters = 1 after the event). The pre-announcement period runs from 2009Q2 to 2011Q2, and the post implementation period runs from 2012Q3 to 2014Q1. The treatment
group is comprised of German firms which had CDS traded on them both before the implementation and after the announcement of the law change. The control group is comprised of other European firms
which had CDS traded on them in the sample period. The treatment and control group are matched using the CEM method on: firm size, book leverage, alternative z-score, and change in the probability
of default in the prior period. Each observation represents the average value for the firm in the respective period (e.g. 26 observations of treated companies prior to the announcement represents 26 German
firms’ average CDS spread prior to the announcement of the law change) Table 1 contains information on each variable used in the table, including: their unit, definition, and source.
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Table 21: Descriptive Statistics: German Reference Entity Vs. European Reference Entity
Control - German Firms with No CDS Traded Treatment - German Firms with CDS Traded
Count Mean Std. Dev P10 P25 P50 P75 P90 Count Mean Std. Dev P10 P25 P50 P75 P90
Probability of Default 128 0.84 1.28 0.09 0.13 0.29 0.99 2.65 40 1.50 3.72 0.10 0.17 0.32 0.57 3.26
Firm Size 101 10.01 1.35 8.12 9.21 10.08 10.85 11.85 32 10.07 1.15 8.62 9.28 10.09 10.84 11.57
Book Leverage 101 0.35 0.26 0.15 0.22 0.32 0.41 0.51 32 0.29 0.10 0.19 0.22 0.25 0.36 0.40
Before Alternative Z-Score 85 0.50 0.43 0.06 0.22 0.48 0.69 0.92 30 0.61 0.24 0.32 0.45 0.64 0.71 0.96
Announcement ∆ Probability of Default 128 -0.16 1.87 -0.90 -0.33 -0.03 0.01 0.28 40 -0.64 2.25 -2.76 -0.25 -0.06 0.02 0.16
of Change in Tangible Asset Ratio 101 0.28 0.19 0.06 0.12 0.25 0.41 0.53 32 0.28 0.15 0.13 0.17 0.25 0.35 0.48
Bankruptcy Law Firm Credit Concentration 128 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 40 1.21 5.18 0.01 0.03 0.12 0.44 1.65
Length of Credit Relationship 128 13.56 8.80 5.89 8.10 11.72 16.02 24.93 40 21.66 7.18 13.48 16.32 20.63 27.42 31.77
# Credit Relationships 128 16.19 21.82 3.00 4.59 8.56 16.13 41.00 40 66.08 56.67 18.88 28.63 43.31 89.19 140.75
Collateral / Total Credit 104 10.50 20.50 0.00 1.21 3.60 11.53 22.55 40 11.87 13.24 0.63 1.50 6.22 16.75 25.06
Net Notional / Total Credit 128 -59.39 628.81 -2.46 -0.20 0.89 3.08 7.02 40 1.40 2.47 -0.27 0.04 0.36 2.65 4.26
Probability of Default 128 0.99 2.87 0.08 0.13 0.24 0.58 1.54 40 0.61 1.30 0.08 0.11 0.17 0.41 0.99
Firm Size 99 10.07 1.39 8.02 9.22 10.10 10.93 12.04 32 10.15 1.17 8.80 9.33 10.24 10.88 11.80
Book Leverage 99 0.33 0.22 0.16 0.22 0.29 0.40 0.50 31 0.27 0.10 0.15 0.19 0.23 0.33 0.38
After Alternative Z-Score 81 0.51 0.40 0.07 0.29 0.49 0.67 0.88 30 0.64 0.26 0.31 0.48 0.63 0.79 1.10
Implementation Tangible Asset Ratio 99 0.27 0.20 0.05 0.11 0.25 0.40 0.54 31 0.28 0.16 0.12 0.16 0.26 0.36 0.52
of Change in Firm Credit Concentration 128 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 40 0.86 3.13 0.01 0.01 0.04 0.17 1.07
Bankruptcy Law Length of Credit Relationship 128 17.11 8.47 7.43 11.76 15.14 21.87 28.99 40 24.01 8.80 12.38 16.30 23.72 31.77 35.39
# Credit Relationships 128 20.51 30.88 2.67 4.35 8.56 22.25 65.00 40 81.60 76.35 16.50 26.69 74.19 110.50 140.21
Collateral / Total Credit 93 16.37 33.01 0.00 0.23 2.81 11.09 48.42 40 20.12 23.44 0.83 2.70 5.61 38.28 60.81
Net Notional / Total Credit 128 -166.23 1892.94 -2.52 -0.07 1.02 3.12 5.67 40 0.78 2.07 -0.42 -0.04 0.40 1.22 2.24
Note: The table contains the sample statistics for the credit weighted sample. The table is split by treatment and control group, and by time (before announcement, after implementation). There is a 2
year window pre and post the event (i.e. 8 quarters = 0 prior, and 8 quarters = 1 after the event). The pre-announcement period runs from 2009Q2 to 2011Q2, and the post implementation period runs
from 2012Q3 to 2014Q1. The treatment group is comprised of German firms which had CDS traded on them both before the implementation and after the announcement of the law change. The control
group is comprised of European firms which had CDS traded on them both before the implementation and after the announcement of the law change. The treatment and control group are matched using
the CEM method on: firm size, book leverage, alternative z-score, and change in the probability of default in the prior period. Each observation represents the credit weighted average value for the firm in
the respective period (e.g. 40 observations of treated companies prior to the announcement represents 40 firms’ credit weighted average value for probability of default prior to the announcement of the law
change) Table 1 contains information on each variable used in the table, including: their unit, definition, and source.
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Table 22: Intensity of the Impact of Empty Creditors - All Variables
(1) (2)
∆PD ∆PD
CDS Ref. Entity -3.113∗∗ 5.759∗∗
(-2.04) (2.10)
Net Notional / Total Credit -0.199∗∗∗ -0.696∗∗∗
(-2.89) (-4.49)
Len. of Relationships -0.023 -0.031
(-1.24) (-1.53)
CDS Ref. Entity × Len. of Relationships 0.061∗ 0.146∗∗∗
(1.86) (3.52)
# Creditor Relationships 0.004 0.009
(0.11) (0.21)
CDS Ref. Entity × # Creditor Relationships 0.001 -0.002
(0.03) (-0.05)
Collateral / Total Credit -0.016∗∗∗ -0.017∗∗∗
(-3.88) (-4.20)
CDS Ref. Entity × Collateral / Total Credit 0.041∗∗ 0.080∗∗∗
(2.16) (3.01)
Firm Credit Concentration -0.000 -0.001∗∗∗
(-0.76) (-5.91)
CDS Ref. Entity × Firm Credit Concentration -0.072 0.085∗∗
(-1.03) (2.30)
Continued on next page
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Table 22 – continued from previous page
(1) (2)
∆PD ∆PD
Firm Size -0.540 -0.317
(-1.19) (-0.65)
CDS Ref. Entity × Firm Size 1.092∗ -0.088
(1.92) (-0.13)
Book Leverage 0.001 -0.005
(0.09) (-0.33)
CDS Ref. Entity × Book Leverage -0.065∗∗ -0.059∗∗
(-2.02) (-2.37)
Tangible Asset Ratio -0.014∗ 0.012
(-1.74) (0.81)
CDS Ref. Entity × Tangible Asset Ratio 0.015 0.025
(0.82) (0.92)
EBIT / TA -0.021 -0.045
(-0.47) (-0.89)
CDS Ref. Entity × EBIT / TA 0.311∗∗ 0.332∗∗∗
(2.26) (3.09)
Legal Size Controls No No
Sector FEs No Yes
Observations 1062 1053
Adj. R2 0.005 0.036
Note: Difference-in-differences regression results for the change in probability of default of German CDS reference entities
relative to other German firms. The regression equation is:
∆PDf = β1Treatedf + β2Xf,BA + β3TreatedfXf,BA + αk + εf
Where, ∆PDf is the change in firm f ’s average probability of default after the implementation of the law change (i.e.
PDf,AI −PDf,BA). Here the averaging is done by weighting each observation by the percentage of the firm’s total credit
provided by the reporting bank. Treatedf is equal to 1 if firm f is a German firm with CDS traded on them over the entire
sample period, and equal to 0 if it never had CDS traded on it, in the sample period. The vector Xf,BA contains firm
characteristics: firm size, book leverage, asset tangibility and concentration of its credit, and bank-firm based variables:
the number of credit relationships a firm has, the average length of these relationships, and the ratio of loan collateral to
loan value. Finally, αk are sector fixed effects. Table 1 contains information on each variable used in the table, including:
their unit, definition, and source. The event is defined as zero before the announcement of the law in 2011 Q2 and 1 after
the implementation in 2012Q3. There is a 2 year window pre and post the event (i.e. 8 quarters = 0 prior, and 8 quarters
= 1 after the event). The treatment and control group are matched using the CEM method on: firm size, book leverage,
alternative z-score, and change in then probability of default in the prior period. All regressions cluster the standard
errors at sector level. We report t statistics between parentheses. ∗, ∗∗ and ∗∗∗ indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and
1% level, respectively.
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